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INTRODUCTION 
This working document is published in parallel with the Report from the Commission to 
the Council and to the European Parliament on the implementation of macro-financial 
assistance (MFA) to third countries in 2010. It provides economic and financial 
information regarding the situation of the beneficiary countries as well as more detailed 
information on the implementation of MFA operations in those countries. Statistical data 
on the different macro-financial assistance decisions adopted since 1990, by date and by 
regions, are included in the annex. 
WESTERN BALKANS 
1.  BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
1.1.  Executive summary 
In 2010, the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was moderately recovering from the 
recession experienced in 2009, with a real GDP growth of 0.9%. The recovery was 
driven by exports, reflecting the strong economic growth of some of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's main trading partners, in particular Germany. Preliminary estimates 
indicate that the consolidated 2010 budget deficit reached 3.8% of GDP, in line with the 
target agreed with the IMF. No agreement was reached on the Global Fiscal Framework 
2011-2013 between the entities and the state level. Because of a political stalemate after 
the 3 October 2010 elections the Parliament and Government of the Federation were only 
constituted in mid-March 2011, while state government formation was still pending in 
the beginning of June 2011.  
The authorities of all government levels concluded in early May 2009 negotiations with 
the IMF on a Stand-By Arrangement that comprised commitments to a number of 
structural reforms and fiscal adjustment measures. The Fund's Board approved a EUR 
1.15 billion loan (13% of GDP; 600% of the quota) for a three-year period on 8 July 
2009. The main policy condition under the programme is a reduction of current 
expenditure, especially wages and social transfers, reducing the structural fiscal deficit. 
No funds were disbursed in 2010 under the current EU macro-financial assistance to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (loan facility of up to EUR 100 million, Council Decision 
2009/891/EC of 30 November 2009). In a pre-election environment, long internal 
discussions in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 2010 delayed the adoption of the 
Memorandum of Understanding establishing the conditionality of EU MFA, which was 
eventually signed on 8 November 2010. The corresponding Loan Agreement has not 
been ratified yet, reflecting the difficulties in setting up governments and parliaments 
after the October 2010 elections. Assuming a timely ratification of the Loan Agreement 
and the fulfilment of the MoU conditions, including good progress under the IMF 
programme, the EU MFA is planned to be disbursed in 2011. 
1.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
After the recession experienced in 2009 with a drop in real GDP of 2.9%, the country 
only moderately recovered in 2010, recording a positive real growth rate of 0.9%, driven 
by external demand. Domestic demand also picked up, supported by a relatively stable  
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inflow of remittances. The growth of industrial production in 2010 was slightly positive, 
reaching 1.6%. When looking at the trade balance in 2010, the annual trend is still 
positive as the deficit decreased by 4.7%. Unlike in 2009, this development was driven 
by exports, which nominally soared by 28.3% year-on-year (in 2009 it was the shrink in 
imports that explained the lower deficit). Manufacturing, accounting for almost 90% of 
overall exports, recorded a 30.5% growth, while the export of agricultural products grew 
by 45%, accounting for a mere 2.3% of overall exports. The trend of an improving trade 
balance was reversed in the second half of 2010 when the increase of imports exceeded 
that of exports in volume, as import levels are much higher than export levels. Imports 
rose by 10.3% in 2010 (nominally). Dominated by trade developments, the current 
account deficit further decreased, reaching 5.2% of GDP in 2010. However, the current 
account also showed a reversed trend as of the third quarter 2010. Capital inflows, in 
particular FDI, remained low and below the already low level of 2009. Nevertheless, net 
FDI turned positive again in the third quarter 2010, after two quarters of negative 
volumes. Foreign exchange reserves remained stable, covering almost six months of 
imports. Due to the continued improvement of the current account and the comfortable 
level of foreign reserves, the external financing needs decreased throughout 2010.
2  
Unemployment was growing throughout the year, but at a decelerating pace. The high 
level of registered unemployment persisted during 2010, reaching 43.3% of the total 
labour force in December. Throughout 2010, employment fell most in construction, 
manufacturing and hotels and restaurants, while on the other hand, the highest growth of 
employment was registered in financial intermediation and transport. According to the 
Labour Force Survey following ILO methodology conducted annually in May, 
unemployment significantly increased to 27.2% in 2010 from 24.1% in 2009. After wage 
increases of previous years, in 2010 decrease in wages in real terms contributed to an 
increase of competitiveness of the Bosnian economy. Nominal gross wages grew by 
2.2% in December compared to end-2009.  
Annual inflation reached 2.1% in 2010, compared to an average annual deflation of 0.4% 
in 2009. The highest increase was registered in transport prices that grew by an average 
of 7.1%, after falling by 9.9% a year earlier. Moreover, food prices lowered their decline 
by 0.2 pps to 0.7%. Inflation in 2010 was also driven by a hike in excise duties on 
tobacco and alcohol, as well as telecommunication costs. The monetary policy of the 
Central Bank continued to be conducted under a currency board arrangement, with the 
euro as the anchor currency, enjoying a high level of confidence and credibility. 
Monetary policy settings remained unchanged throughout 2010 after minimum reserve 
requirements had been lowered in several steps between October 2008 and May 2009 in 
order to boost the liquidity of the banking sector during the financial turmoil.  
The estimated budgetary outcome for 2010 of a consolidated deficit of 3.8% of GDP is 
below the previous year's outcome and the target of 4½% set under the IMF programme.
3 
This is due to the faster than expected recovery of revenues and the adjustment measures 
on the expenditure side, in particular wage cuts in the public sector, which reduced the 
                                                 
2  The estimate by the IMF of external financing needs for 2010 decreased from 5.6% of GDP in the first 
programme review in March to 4.1% of GDP in the second and third reviews in October.  
3   It needs to be underlined, though, that in this estimate expenditure side GDP data are used, while the 
IMF uses production-side GDP data (not yet published), which are lower. Therefore, the budget deficit 
to GDP figure following the IMF methodology is likely to be higher.  
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consolidated wage bill by 1.5% in nominal terms. Consolidated revenues increased by 
2.6% in 2010. 44% of the revenues originated from indirect taxes that increased by 8.3%, 
driven by the resuming economic activity, the development of imports and import prices 
and the increase of some road tolls and excise duties on tobacco, and despite the 
reduction of tariffs following the entry into force of the Interim Agreement on trade with 
the EU in mid-2008. Despite the positive development, the level of collected indirect 
taxes in 2010 was still lower than in 2008. Expenses increased by 6.6% year-on-year in 
2010. Current spending dominates the budgets with wages accounting for 27% of overall 
expenditure and subsidies and transfers (mainly social benefits) for 37%, both marginally 
lower in relative terms than in the previous year. Temporary budgets have been in place 
in the first and second quarter 2011 at state level, and in the first quarter in the 
Federation. The Parliament of the Republika Srpska had adopted the 2011 budget in 
December 2010.  
The sharp economic downturn of 2009 and the slow recovery of 2010 revealed the 
vulnerabilities of the country’s growth model relying on externally financed 
consumption, thus creating large external imbalances. The current account improved 
over that period, but this trend is already reversing. The productive capacity and the 
competitiveness of the economy remain weak.  
1.3.  Structural reforms 
Commitment to fiscal adjustment and structural reform measures, as well as their 
implementation, was uneven across the country. Some fiscal and structural reform 
measures were enacted under the pressure of budgetary imbalances and the IMF 
programme. Nevertheless, budgets are still not self-sustaining and the quality of public 
finances remains weak with high shares of current expenditures to GDP. Some 
improvements in public financial management and control structures can be noted, partly 
linked to the MFA conditionality. Privatisation, restructuring of public enterprises and 
the liberalisation of network industries did not advance. Upgrading of infrastructure has 
proceeded, though at a slow pace. Structural rigidities such as high taxation of labour   
and low labour mobility continue to hamper job creation and labour market participation. 
The generous and poorly targeted social transfers reduce the propensity to work, further 
highlighting the need for reform of the social benefits system. The business environment 
is affected by administrative inefficiencies and the weak rule of law. 
In the context of the IMF programme, substantial savings were envisaged in the public 
sector wage bill and in transfers, reflecting the elimination of special unemployment 
benefits for demobilised soldiers, the implementation of eligibility audits for civil and 
war benefit recipients and strict control over pensions provided on favourable terms. The 
State level froze wages in 2010. After initial delays, the Federation advanced the reform 
agenda over the summer: The parliament adopted a new civil service wage law at the end 
of July rationalising the wage bill by, inter alia, consolidating a large number of 
allowances into the base wage. The government approved a pension reform strategy 
which, however, was later withdrawn from parliamentary procedure. Eligibility audits of 
privileged pension and war disability benefit recipients started in July, albeit slowly. In 
Republika Srpska wages in public administration were frozen in 2010 after the cuts in 
2009. As less hires than planned were effected, the wage bill decreased by 1.1%. An 
eligibility audit for social transfers was conducted in Republika Srpska, reducing the 
number of beneficiaries.  
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In Republika Srpska around 69% of the initial stock of state-owned capital intended for 
privatisation had been sold by May 2010, practically unchanged from a year earlier. 
After a series of failed privatisation deals the privatisation agency of the Federation 
developed a revised action plan for 2009-10, including the privatisation of the entire 
public share in eight companies. Progress in this area is very slow and several auctions 
have failed as they did not attract interested parties. The privatisation of an 88% share in 
the aluminium company Aluminij d.d. Mostar, one of the largest enterprises in the 
country and a key source of export revenue, which had been pending for more than three 
years, was declared to have failed. 
The ‘legislative guillotine’ project to reduce administrative burdens has been completed 
in Republika Srpska. In the Federation, the parliament amended 34 laws in July 2010 
initiating the second stage of this regulatory reform, simplifying and streamlining 35 
priority administrative procedures. Businesses nevertheless continue to suffer from 
political instability, the high tax burden, and slow contract enforcement and business 
registration procedures. In the World Bank's 2011 Doing Business Report Bosnia and 
Herzegovina ranks 110
th in the world (out of 183 countries), still lagging behind its 
neighbours. Moreover, complicated procedures for starting a business, dealings with 
construction permits, enforcement of contracts and difficult access to financing are 
further deteriorating the business environment.   
1.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The performance under the IMF Standby Arrangement, to which the EU's macro-
financial assistance is linked, remained broadly satisfactory. In March 2010, the IMF 
Executive Board approved the first review of the programme which resulted in the 
release of the second and third tranche in the amount of approximately EUR 140 million. 
In October, the IMF Board approved the second and third reviews, making available 
some EUR 130 million. However, the central bank, in view of a comfortable level of its 
foreign exchange reserves, decided not to draw on the funds made available in October. 
Thus, only EUR 38 million of this tranche were drawn by the authorities, channelled 
completely as budget support to the entities. A total amount of around EUR 385 million 
has been disbursed under the programme so far, with 100% of these funds transferred to 
the entity budgets.  
In November 2009, the EU Council approved a macro-financial assistance of up to EUR 
100 million in the form of loans. The assistance aims at alleviating the impact that the 
economic crisis had on Bosnia and Herzegovina's stressed budgetary and external 
position and at contributing to fill the remainder of the external and budgetary financing 
gap as identified in the IMF programme.  
In the course of 2010, the Commission agreed the economic policy conditions with the 
Bosnian authorities in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was finally signed 
in November 2010, after the state and the entities eventually agreed amongst themselves 
on all policy conditions negotiated with the Commission. The disbursement will be 
conditional upon a satisfactory track record in the implementation of the current Standby 
Arrangement with the IMF, as well as upon a positive evaluation by the European 
Commission of progress made with respect to a number of structural reforms. The MoU 
stipulates that the MFA will be disbursed in two tranches and that the proceeds may be 
transferred to the state and entity budgets according to the following distribution key: 
10% to the state level, 60% to the Federation and 30% to Republika Srpska. The specific  
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policy conditions tackle public financial management issues, statistics and budgetary 
procedures. The detailed financial terms of the assistance were spelled out in the Loan 
Agreement which was signed in November. However, due to the non-establishment of 
governments and parliaments in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the October 2010 
elections, it has not been ratified yet.  
Given the delays in the signing of the MoU and the corresponding Loan Agreement 
caused by internal political disagreements in a pre-election environment and by the 
difficulties in government formation after the elections – the main stumbling blocks for 
the signing of the MoU were the distribution of funds available from the MFA between 
the different levels of government and one of the technical conditions related to the 
cooperation of the Statistical Institutes at state and entity level – no funds were disbursed 
during 2010. In addition, one of the two policy conditions agreed for the disbursement of 
the first tranche - the approval of the Global Framework of Fiscal Policies by the Fiscal 
Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the years 2011-2013 - was not met. This 
Framework is a key instrument for medium-term budgetary planning and an 
indispensable element of the annual budgetary process, of particular relevance in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina given the federal structure of the country. The Fiscal Council did not 
approve this Framework which by Law was due on 31 May 2010. 
Some progress was, however, made on the fulfilment of policy conditions in the area of 
public financial management. These conditions were mostly derived from the findings of 
the operational assessment of financial circuits and procedures in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina carried out in November 2009, for example as regards the full functioning 
of the Central Harmonisation Unit and the management of public domestic debt. 
The disbursement of the EU MFA is planned for 2011, assuming that the Loan 
Agreement can be ratified timely enough, that the IMF programme remains on track and 
that all policy conditions as laid down in the MoU for the first and second tranche are 
fulfilled.   
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BIH) 
1.  Price liberalisation  
Most prices are liberalised even though a number of administered prices remains for some 
utilities and infrastructure as well as in some other areas.  
2.  Trade liberalisation  
BiH started WTO accession negotiations in 1999. In July 2008, the Interim Agreement of 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU entered into force. BiH is part of 
the CEFTA agreement. 
3.  Exchange rate regime  
In 1997, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina established a currency board with the 
Deutsche Mark as the anchor currency which has functioned smoothly since then. With the 
introduction of the euro the Bosnian Convertible Mark was pegged at 1.95583 to the euro 
and has remained unchanged since then.  
4.  Foreign direct investment  
FDI inflows reached a peak in 2007 (when the telecommunications company of Republika 
Srpska was privatised), fell to a level in line with the years prior to 2007 in 2008 and then 
halved in 2009, falling to around 2½% of GDP. Net FDI became even negative in the first 
half of 2010 and turned positive again in the third quarter. FDI has been mainly related to 
privatisation transactions, as green-field investment is still hampered by weaknesses in the 
business environment.  
5.  Monetary policy  
The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBBH) is responsible for operating the 
currency board arrangement which limits the scope of monetary policy basically to 
minimum reserve requirement ratios.  
6.  Public finances  
The quality of public finances in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be low. The ratio of 
general government expenditure to GDP continuously increased in recent years from 37.1% 
in 2005 to 43.4% in 2010. Expenditure was not shifted towards growth-enhancing areas but 
remained concentrated in current expenditure, in particular on wages and social benefits. 
The fiscal balance of the general government was positive until 2007, but in the following 
years increasing fiscal deficits materialised due to the economic crisis. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring  
While the privatisation and enterprise restructuring process is already advanced in the RS, 
progress has remained limited in the Federation. 
8.  Financial sector reform  
The financial sector is dominated by banks.  The sector remained overall sound and stable 
during the economic and financial crisis, but it profitability and the quality of the loan 
portfolio deteriorated throughout 2010. A Standing Committee for Financial Stability was 
established in 2010. The limit on guaranteed bank deposits was further increased to around 
EUR 18,000 (from around EUR 10,000) as of April 2010. 
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2.  KOSOVO
4 
2.1.  Executive summary 
According to the latest national accounts data, real GDP grew by 2.9% in 2009, driven 
mainly by government consumption and investment. There are growing risks to this 
growth profile, which is likely to have been repeated in 2010, as recent fiscal expansion 
is reaching its limits. The labour market is stagnant with high level of unemployment. By 
end of March 2011 consumer price inflation reached a double-digit level, spurred by 
raising food and energy prices. Providing a reliable electricity supply remains a major 
challenge for private sector development. 
In November 2006, the Council decided to make available to Kosovo exceptional 
financial assistance in the form of budget support grants of up to EUR 50 million. 
However, until end-2009 the assistance was not disbursed as key conditions, in particular 
an understanding with the IMF, as well as the confirmation of budgetary financing needs, 
were not met. The European Commission adopted in December 2009 a Decision to 
extend the availability period of the EU exceptional financial assistance to Kosovo by 
one additional year, until 11 December 2010. 
Following the approval by the Executive Board of the IMF on 21 July 2010 of an 18-
month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), and upon satisfactory compliance with 
conditionality requirements agreed upon in 2007, the European Commission disbursed in 
September 2010 the first tranche (EUR 30 million) of the exceptional Community 
financial assistance to Kosovo. The money entered the budget as a grant. 
In November 2010, after a non-confidence motion, the Parliament was dissolved and 
early parliamentary elections were held on 12 December. As a consequence of the 
dissolution of the Assembly, the 2011 budget was not approved. Thus, the IMF could not 
complete its review of the SBA by the end of November, as originally envisaged, and 
disburse the second tranche of the IMF loan. Under these circumstances, it was not 
possible to assess whether the agreement with the IMF remained on track, which was a 
key condition for the release of the second tranche of the EU MFA to Kosovo, thus 
preventing its disbursement before the assistance expired in December 2010. In mid-July 
2011, the government entered into a new agreement with the IMF – a non-disbursing 
Staff Monitored Programme (SMP) to replace the SBA and run until the end of 2011. 
2.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
In November 2010, the Statistical Office of Kosovo published revised GDP data for 
2004-2009 and, for the first time, estimates about real GDP growth rates. Real GDP 
increased by 2.9% in 2009, mainly driven by public expenditure. Investments grew by 
13.6%, households consumption rose moderately by 1.5%, while donor consumption 
shrunk by 14.8%. There are growing risks to the growth profile, as the fiscal expansion 
that has been underpinning it is reaching its limits. 
In 2010 exports of goods (mainly base metals) increased, although from a very low level, 
by 78%. Imports increased as well, by 11%. However, even with the higher relative 
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increase of exports, the trade deficit further increased to EUR 1,851 million compared to 
EUR 1,770 million a year earlier. According to balance-of-payments statistics, in the first 
three quarters of 2010 the current account deficit was EUR 512.2 million, increasing 
against a deficit of EUR 450.5 million in the corresponding period of 2009. This 
deterioration was mainly driven by increased payments for construction services in the 
second quarter of the year. The surplus on the capital and financial account (EUR 315.1 
million) was not sufficient to cover the current account deficit. The European Union and 
the countries of CEFTA remain the main trading partners of Kosovo. 
The monetary framework is anchored on the use of the euro as legal tender. The Central 
Bank of Kosovo, therefore, cannot implement an independent monetary or exchange rate 
policy. Its role lies in supervising the financial sector and monitoring liquidity in the 
banking sector and credit expansion, with liquidity ratios and reserve requirements as 
main policy tools. The banking system consists of eight banks which mainly engage in 
domestic deposit-taking and lending. The degree of concentration of the banking system 
remains high, with about 80% of the assets managed by three banks. More than 90% of 
the assets in the sector are handled by banks under foreign ownership. By end-February 
2011, annual deposit growth stood at 8.1% and credit growth at 14.4%. The loans-to-
deposit ratio was 77.2%, below the informal Central Bank benchmark according to 
which it should not exceed 80%. The net profit of the banking sector increased by 45% in 
2010 (year-on-year) to EUR 36.6 million, mainly driven by higher interest income. 
After accelerating in the summer of 2010, inflation continued rising steadily to reach a 
double-digit level of 10.8% (year-on-year) by the end of March 2011. The main drivers 
of the inflationary dynamic were food and fuel prices, contributing respectively 8.1 and 
1.4 percentage points. The prices of basic goods, such as bread and cereals and oils and 
fats, increased by more than 40%, hitting disproportionally the poor segments of the 
population. By end-March, the goods and services with positive contribution to inflation 
had increased their weight to 95% of the whole CPI basket, pointing to a broad-based 
inflationary pressure. Average annual inflation in 2010 stood at 3.5%, after a deflation of 
2.4% in 2009. 
The unemployment rate in Kosovo is very high at above 40%. Most of the 
unemployment is long-term, pointing to very low dynamics in the labour market, even 
though the informal sector distorts the actual picture. In the last three quarters of 2010, 
the number of registered unemployed remained stable at around 335 thousand, though 
about 1% lower than a year ago. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
data, registered unemployed decreased slightly across all skill levels. Nevertheless, with 
a share of 60% of the total number of unemployed, unskilled unemployment is still 
dominant. 
Budgetary developments in Kosovo have been quite volatile and hard to predict in recent 
years. The budget deficit increased from 0.1% of GDP in 2008 to 0.7% in 2009. The 
underlying deficit was, however, much higher, rising to about 5.8% of GDP in 2009, if a 
one-off EUR 200 million dividend payment received from Post and Telecommunications 
of Kosovo is deducted from total revenue. According to preliminary data from the 
Ministry of economy and finance, in 2010 the general government had a lower than 
expected deficit of EUR 115 million (2.8% of GDP). However, the underlying deficit 
(net of grants and dividends) remained broadly unchanged at 5.6% of GDP. By the end 
of December 2010 usable and readily available government bank balances were EUR 
243 million, or slightly above its target according to the IMF programme.  
12 
Total revenue and grants stood at EUR 1,156 million by the end of December (including 
EUR 30 million of EU budget support). The underlying revenue growth of 10% 
(excluding dividends and grants) was underpinned by strong performance of almost all 
revenue components. Total expenditure reached EUR 1,272 million. Expenditure at 
central level grew by 3% and at municipal level by 14%. Capital outlays increased by 
11% at central government level and by 23% at municipal level, followed by increased 
spending on wages and salaries – by 23% at central and 12% at local level. 
Due to the early elections, the approval of the 2011 budget was delayed and the 
Assembly voted in on 31 March 2011. The budget includes a substantial increase of 
government sector employees' wages (by 30% to 50%) – a measure that deviates from 
commitments made in the current IMF programme and that is likely to lead to a 
deterioration of price competitiveness and external imbalances as well as to lower job 
creation incentives. Fiscal sustainability remains at risk, as expenditure pressures have 
not subsided. 
2.3.  Structural reforms 
Kosovo’s enterprise sector remained dominated by micro-enterprises, with more than 
90% of the enterprises employing less than four people. The economic structure is highly 
concentrated on the retail sector, with about half of all enterprises operating in this field. 
In 2010, a Law on Economic Zones was adopted and the procedure to establish six 
zones, one at central and five at municipal level, started. Information on registered 
companies became available online. Online registration of companies so far is only 
possible at the ‘one stop shops’ or municipal business centres that have been established 
in 22 municipalities. Fees for starting and closing a business are low, but the relatively 
large number of inactive firms in the business register suggests that the market exit 
regulations and implementation thereof could be improved further. 
In the area of public finance and administration limited progress was recorded in 2010. In 
order to develop and strengthen its debt management capacity, in June 2010 the Treasury 
reorganised its Cash and Debt Management Division into two separate units dealing 
respectively with cash and debt management. In September 2010, the Statistical Office of 
Kosovo approved an action plan for compiling and publishing comprehensive statistics 
on national accounts and labour market. 
The Privatisation Agency of Kosovo continued the privatisation of socially owned 
enterprises, albeit mainly small businesses, with limited macroeconomic impact. In 2010, 
the agency started liquidation of socially owned enterprises for which there is no investor 
interest in privatisation. Privatisation proceeds from the sale of socially owned 
enterprises have been kept, in accordance with existing legislation and MFA 
conditionality, in a single trust account at the Central Bank. The government hired 
transaction advisors for privatising the Post and Telecommunications of Kosovo and the 
distribution and supply functions of the public electricity company (Kosovo Energy 
Corporation, KEK). Both privatisation deals and the transaction for the development of a 
new Kosovo power plant were, however, significantly delayed and could not be 
concluded in 2010. 
Providing a reliable electricity supply remains a challenge for private sector 
development. Despite some improvements in billing and collection in 2009, and 
establishment of annual targets for improving billing and bill collection rate in line with  
13 
MFA conditionality, about 42% of the energy entering the public electricity company 
network was not paid for. KEK continued to receive in 2010 substantial subsidies from 
the state budget for electricity imports and loans for financing its investment programme. 
2.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In November 2006, the Council decided to make available to Kosovo exceptional 
financial assistance in the form of budget support grants of up to EUR 50 million 
(Council Decision 2006/880/EC of 30 November 2006). This assistance was made 
available with a view to alleviating the financial situation in Kosovo, supporting the 
development of a sound economic and fiscal framework, facilitating the continuation and 
strengthening of essential administrative functions, and addressing public investment 
needs. In December 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding laying down the conditions 
for the release of the assistance was signed between the European Commission and the 
Kosovo authorities. However, the assistance was not disbursed by end-2009 as key 
conditions, in particular a financial arrangement with the IMF, as well as the 
confirmation of budgetary financing needs, were not met. 
The availability period of the exceptional Community financial assistance to Kosovo was 
to expire two years after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding laying down 
the conditions for the release of the assistance, i.e. on 11 December 2009, but was 
extended in December 2009 for an additional year by the Commission, after consulting 
the EFC (Decision 2009/918/EU of 7 December 2009). Subsequently, Addenda to the 
Memorandum of Understanding and to the Grant Agreement were signed by the Kosovo 
authorities and the Commission to that effect in early 2010. 
Following the approval by the Executive Board of the IMF on 21 July 2010 of an 18-
month Stand-By Arrangement, in early September 2010, and upon satisfactory 
compliance with other conditionality requirements, the Commission disbursed the first 
tranche (EUR 30 million) of the exceptional financial assistance to Kosovo. The policy 
conditions agreed with the EU included the adoption of a revised Medium-Term 
Expenditure framework in June 2010, enhancing the administrative capacity in the areas 
of internal audit and Treasury management, and maintaining the ring-fencing of 
privatisation proceeds in line with legislative requirements. The money was disbursed to 
the budget in the form of a grant. 
In November 2010, after a non-confidence motion, the Kosovo Parliament was dissolved 
and early parliamentary elections were held on 12 December. As a consequence of the 
dissolution of the Assembly, the 2011 budget has not been approved. Thus, the IMF 
could not complete its review of the Stand-By Arrangement by the end of November, as 
originally envisaged, and disburse the second tranche of the IMF loan. Under these 
circumstances, the Commission could not assess whether the agreement with the IMF 
remained on track, which was a key condition for the release of the second tranche of the 
EU macro-financial assistance to Kosovo. The availability of the assistance expired in 
December 2010 and could not be renewed.  
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
KOSOVO 
1.  Price liberalisation 
The price setting mechanism is basically free. Current governance arrangements as regards 
publicly-owned enterprises ensure the absence of government interference in the price setting 
mechanism of their services. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Kosovo does not enjoy preferential access to the EU market following the expiration of the 
autonomous trade measures. It is part of CEFTA, however, three parties to this free trade 
agreement, namely Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova, do not  recognise its customs 
stamp and, as a result, prevent free flow of goods from Kosovo. 
3.  Exchange rate regime 
Kosovo continued to use the euro as sole legal tender.  The Central Bank of Kosovo is in charge 
of regulating foreign exchange operations, providing payments services and supervising banks 
and other financial institutions. 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
Net FDI inflows are estimated to have reached EUR 191 million (4.6% of GDP) in the first three 
quarters of 2010, almost unchanged from EUR 195 million (5.0% of GDP) in the same period of 
2009. 
5.  Monetary policy 
The monetary framework remained anchored on the use of the euro as sole legal tender. 
6.  Public finance 
The execution of the budget in 2010 was characterised by a strong revenue performance and a 
substantial increase in both current and capital spending.  Preliminary data point to an annual 
2010 budget deficit of 2.8% of GDP. Fiscal sustainability is at risk, as expenditure pressures have 
not subsided. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
In 2010, the Privatisation Agency of Kosovo started liquidating socially owned enterprises for 
which there is no investor interest in privatisation. The government hired transaction advisors for 
privatising the Post and Telecommunications of Kosovo and the distribution and supply 
functions of the public electricity company (Kosovo Energy Corporation). Both privatisation 
deals and the transaction for the development of the new Kosovo power plant have, however, 
been significantly delayed and could not be concluded in 2010. 
8.  Financial sector reform 
The degree of concentration of the banking system remains high, with about 80% of the assets 
managed by three banks. More than 90% of the assets in the sector are handled by banks under 
foreign ownership. By the end-February 2011, the loans-to-deposit ratio was 77.2%, pointing to a 
conservative banking model. In 2010 banks' profits increased by 45% (year-on-year) to EUR 
36.6 million, mainly driven by higher interest income. 
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3.  SERBIA 
3.1.  Executive summary 
Following a 3.1% drop of output in real terms in 2009, Serbia's economy recovered in 
2010 with GDP up by 1.8% driven by vigorous broad-based export growth. 
Macroeconomic stability was anchored by the economic programme supported by the 
IMF under the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), which remained broadly on track 
throughout the implementation period between May 2009 and April 2011. The balance of 
payments position stayed solid thanks to the containment of the current account deficit at 
around 7% of GDP.  However, public finances deteriorated as the supplementary budget 
allowed the fiscal deficit to widen to 4.7% of GDP against the provision of additional 
social assistance and subsidies. Considerable strides have been made in transforming 
Serbia towards a market economy over the past years, but the pace of reforms slowed 
down in the wake of the recession. 
The Council decision of 30 November 2009 (2009/892/EC), which granted Serbia 
macro-financial assistance in the form of a loan facility of up to EUR 200 million, was 
followed by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on 5 July 2010 and of the 
Loan Agreement by the end of the year. The objective of this assistance was to help the 
government address residual external financing and budgetary needs that emerged as a 
consequence of the strong economic slowdown. This assistance from the EU is 
complementary to the resources provided by international financial institutions and 
bilateral donors. In light of the scaling down of the IMF assistance against lower foreign 
financing needs, the European Commission informed the Economic and Financial 
committee in July 2010 that it was planning to disburse only the first EUR 100 million 
tranche. Following the completion of the ratification procedures in Serbia in March 2011, 
the Commission is currently preparing the disbursement, which is planned to take place 
by July 2011. 
3.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Following a 3.5% drop of output in real terms in 2009 against the backdrop of the global 
crisis, the economy recovered in 2010. Up by 1.8%, GDP rebounded more than expected 
(1.5%, according to the IMF and national forecasts). After strengthening steadily over 
the first half of the year, economic activity accelerated vigorously in the third quarter but 
moderated again in the last three months of the year. 
The economic upturn in 2010 was driven by export expansion as revival was gradually 
underway in Serbia's main trading partners, and the dinar continued to depreciate. 
Domestic consumption and investment began to pick up only slowly against the 
background of constrained disposable incomes. 
Buoyant foreign demand stimulated a rebound of industrial activity, up by almost 3% 
compared to 2009, thanks especially to solid growth in manufacturing of basic metals 
and chemicals. However, services continued to provide the main stimulus to growth. 
Transport and financial intermediation expanded by almost 7% following some 
deceleration towards the end of the year as the economy hit a soft patch. By contrast, 
construction and agriculture shrunk compared to 2009 in face of the ongoing economic 
rebalancing toward more export-based growth and unfavourable market conditions. The  
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hospitality sector too contracted in spite of a strong acceleration in the fourth quarter on 
the back of a pick-up in private spending. 
Contrary to expectations that the gradual recovery in activity and trade would impair 
Serbia's external position, the current account gap stayed contained well below the pre-
crisis level thanks to vigorous broad-based export activity. The current account deficit 
narrowed further by a notch to about 7% of GDP as the merchandise trade deficit was 
some 7% lower than the year before. Exports rallied against the solid external demand, 
supported also by the steady dinar depreciation. By contrast, imports strengthened 
steadily over the year as manufacturing sustained the momentum driven by foreign 
demand. The current account deficit was smaller compared to 2009 despite the higher 
income account deficit (up by a third year-on-year) and the slightly lower surplus on the 
current transfers account (notwithstanding the sustained high inflow of remittances). 
Throughout 2010, financial and capital flows remained modest, with FDI markedly lower 
in comparison with 2009. At the same time, private sector's external liabilities decreased 
as companies and banks were repaying foreign loans. Foreign currency inflows have 
been largely insufficient to cover the current account deficit. During 2010, total external 
debt rose by almost EUR 1.3 billion to around EUR 23.8 billion, i.e. close to 80% of 
GDP. 
In the context of the sixth SBA review at end-2010, the IMF re-estimated Serbia's 2010 
gross external financing requirements to EUR 6.24 billion (against an earlier estimate of 
EUR 8.54 billion), due to a lower current account deficit and in view of the comfortable 
reserves position. After deducting available financing, the external financing gap stood at 
EUR 470 million in 2010 (against EUR 2.1 billion, expected previously). 
In 2010, the foreign reserves held by the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) remained 
largely stable at about EUR 10 billion, i.e. more than a third of GDP, or sufficient to 
cover some 9 months’ worth of imports, despite the NBS intervening regularly on the 
interbank market. A number of foreign exchange operations were undertaken throughout 
the year to smooth the exchange rate depreciation. Following some strengthening of the 
dinar towards the end of the year, the RSD/EUR exchange rate overall depreciated by 
around 10% during 2010. Pursuing exchange rate stability partly overshadowed inflation 
targeting, the main monetary policy objective. In view of the renewed inflationary 
tensions, the NBS reverted in August from the gradual easing of monetary conditions to a 
monetary tightening. By end-2010, the reference interest rate had been hiked in several 
steps from 8% to 11.5% (currently at 12.5%). Disinflation was interrupted in the middle 
of 2010 due to rising agricultural/food prices and the dinar depreciation. Tensions built 
up further based on the expected strengthening of domestic demand in step with the 
gradual pick-up of economic activity and higher bank lending. By the end of 2010, CPI 
inflation soared to 10.3% year-on-year (6.6% in 2009), overshooting the 4-8% target 
range set by the NBS. 
In spite of the gradual economic recovery, the labour market situation remained strife 
throughout 2010. The LFS unemployment rate lingered at 20% and was one of the 
highest in the region. From the second half of the year, job losses were contained and the 
employment rate stabilised at some 47%. In 2010, wage moderation continued to prevail 
owing largely to the agreement to keep public sector wages frozen in nominal terms. 
Compared to 2009, the average net wage increased by 7.6% in nominal and 0.7% in real 
terms. Wage rises are expected to be more substantial from 2011 onwards as indexation  
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of public sector salaries is re-introduced, but are likely to remain subdued given the weak 
labour market. 
In 2010, public finances remained under pressure in the face of a fragile economic 
recovery  In May, the revised agreement with the IMF allowed for the general 
government deficit to be widened by 0.3pp, to 4.8% of GDP, due to a revenue shortfall in 
face of a sluggish economic recovery. While revenue performance improved in the 
second half of the year as economic activity was picking up, a supplementary budget was 
nevertheless adopted in November. Additional social assistance and subsidies were 
provided in response to the weak labour market performance and poor living conditions. 
The outcome was broadly in line with the plans; at 4.7% of GDP the deficit was one of 
the highest in the past decade. 
Compared to 2009, the share of expenditure as a percentage of GDP is estimated to have 
decreased by 0.3 percentage points, to 46.4%. Current expenditure (which accounts for 
more than 90% of total expenditure and almost 40% of GDP) remained constrained as a 
set of ad-hoc emergency measures agreed with the IMF under the SBA programme 
continued to be implemented. Since mid-2009, public savings were fostered by the 
nominal freeze of public administration salaries and pensions as well as restricted hiring 
in the public sector. However, these were partially offset by higher social assistance 
spending. Capital expenditure also increased in 2010 by around 13% in nominal terms. 
The revenue ratio is estimated to have reached 41.7% of GDP, a drop of 0.6 percentage 
points compared to 2009. As the labour market was slow to improve and public sector 
salaries remained frozen, personal income tax revenue underperformed. Furthermore, 
corporate income tax revenue was constrained by the ongoing balance-sheets repair. On 
the other hand, indirect tax revenues began to recover as VAT strengthened in step with 
the gradual economic upturn and excise taxes increased as a consequence of the hike in 
excise duties on diesel and gasoline. In spite of the steady rise in imports, however, 
customs revenues continued to decrease due notably to the lowering of tariffs following 
the start of implementation of several free trade agreements, including the Interim 
Agreement of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. 
The budgetary gap spurred government borrowing but financing proved difficult given 
the lack of investors' interest in treasury bills with long-end maturities due to the 
significant exchange rate risk. In 2010, public debt rose by around 2 billion, amounting 
to 42.7% of GDP, an increase of around 8.5 percentage points compared to 2009. 
3.3.  Structural reforms 
Considerable strides have been made in transforming the economy over the past years; 
however, the pace of reforms slowed down in the wake of the crisis. Recently, the 
momentum took off again. Important challenges remain, especially related to creating a 
viable market economy and a business-friendly environment. Deficiencies in 
competition, the regulatory environment, administrative procedures, rule of law and 
infrastructure bottlenecks remain barriers to doing business. 
With the aim to strengthen fiscal discipline, the government adopted amendments to the 
budget system law in late September 2010, which also constituted a required structural 
reform measure for disbursement of the first MFA instalment. A set of quantitative rules 
has been designed to underpin fiscal consolidation in the medium run. Improved  
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procedures and the setting-up of a fiscal council are deemed to anchor fiscal 
responsibility. Together with the new pension law, which extends the working period and 
age for assuming pension rights and adjusts the indexation mechanism, this may enhance 
the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Sluggish privatisation has been one of the weakest points of the reforms in Serbia. 
Privatisation of the socially-owned companies continued in 2009-2010, but at a slower 
pace. A number of sale contracts were again repealed due to non-compliance with the 
contracted obligations, which brought the number of privatisations annulled to almost 
one quarter of the firms initially scheduled for privatisation. The government once more 
extended the deadline for finalising privatisation of the socially-owned companies to 30 
June 2011. Likewise, privatisation of the large state-owned companies was postponed 
given the economic circumstances. However, the government announced privatisation 
strategies for a number of companies as the situation in the global markets improved. 
Notably, a tender for the sale of the telecoms incumbent company was called in October. 
No progress has been made as regards stepping up the processes of denationalisation and 
restitution. 
In spite of further steps in establishing legal predictability and removing red tape, the 
business environment continues to be constrained by the weak enforcement of the rule of 
law, especially with regard to property rights, which hampers market entry and exit. The 
reform of economic governance systems and regulatory institutions is slow, which 
further impedes competition. 
There is political consensus on the need to advance structural reforms in the direction of 
developing industrial sectors at the high value-added part of the productive chain, which 
will bolster export expansion. An improved economic performance will further depend 
on the country’s ability to attract foreign investment and to deal with structural rigidities 
on the labour market, reflected in the persistently high unemployment and a low 
participation rate, particularly of older workers. 
3.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Given the tighter external financing conditions in the aftermath of the global crisis, the 
IMF granted Serbia a EUR 3 billion loan in the framework of an SBA programme to run 
between May 2009 and April 2011. By the end of 2010, Serbia had concluded 
successfully six of the reviews under the IMF SBA. The final review of the SBA was 
completed in April 2011. However, since March 2010 the Serbian authorities have been 
drawing upon the available amounts only partially given the country's ample foreign 
exchange reserves. The total disbursements under the SBA were about EUR 1.5 billion, 
i.e. roughly half of the programme's funds. 
Over 2010, complementary financial assistance was provided by international financial 
institutions and bilateral donors to help the government address residual budgetary needs. The 
World Bank approved lending of USD 250 million through its Development Policy Loan 
programmes, part of which was turned into a guarantee for commercial borrowing worth USD 
400 million. Additionally, the EU agreed to provide budget support of EUR 100 million 
under the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). Two tranches of EUR 50 million each 
were disbursed at the end of 2009 and 2010, in light of the broadly satisfactory 
implementation of the economic policy programme, as assessed by the IMF, and 
fulfilment of specific conditions required for payment.  
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To top up the IMF and the World Bank funds, the EU also approved a macro-financial 
assistance of up to EUR 200 million in the form of a loan in November 2009. The 
objective of this assistance was to help the authorities address residual external financing 
and budgetary needs that emerged as a consequence of the global crisis. 
In the spring of 2010, a Memorandum of Understanding and the Loan Agreement 
detailing a set of economic policy conditions and the terms for disbursement of 
assistance were negotiated with the Serbian authorities. After consulting the EFC, the 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 5 July 2010. It stipulates that a loan for a 
maximum amount of EUR 200 million would be released in two equal instalments of 
EUR 100 million each. Disbursements are conditional upon a satisfactory track record in 
the implementation of the current IMF SBA, as well as priority reforms of the public 
finance management. The latter priority reforms are due to take place in six major areas: 
fiscal responsibility within the budget process, accounting, internal control, internal and 
external audit, and public debt management. 
The loan facility, while primarily geared towards covering balance-of-payments needs, 
might also be used to address budgetary needs. In light of the gradual economic 
recovery, lower foreign financing needs and the fact that Serbia had decided to draw on 
only 50% of the funds made available by the IMF under the SBA, the Commission 
informed in July 2010 the Economic and Financial Committee of its intention to scale 
down the planned assistance to half the original amount. Following the completion of all 
the internal ratification procedures in Serbia in March 2011, the Commission is currently 
preparing the disbursement of the EUR 100 million loan in one tranche. This 
disbursement is planned to take place by July 2011, subject to a satisfactory fulfilment of 
condition requirements. 
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM - SERBIA 
1.  Price liberalisation 
The share of administrative prices accounts for about a quarter in the CPI inflation basket. The 
government regulates prices of state-owned utilities in the area of fuel, electricity, 
telecommunication, communal and other public services. In the middle of 2010, the market 
formation of prices was challenged as the state intervened following the shortage of basic food 
items such as dairy and cooking oil. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
In December 2009, the EU unblocked the Interim Agreement which Serbia had been implementing 
unilaterally since January 2009. Since 2010, the ratification process of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement signed in April 2008 has been underway. By May 2011, 16 Member States 
had ratified the Agreement. 
3.  Exchange rate regime 
The monetary policy setting fosters a managed float of the dinar. Nevertheless, the National Bank 
of Serbia (NBS) has been intervening in the interbank market. In 2010, the NBS sold more than 
EUR 2.5 billion over a number of FOREX operations. 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
There are no controls on inward direct investment. By end-2010, net FDI inflows reached EUR 
860 million (EUR 1.4 billion, i.e. 4.4% of GDP in 2009). 
5.  Monetary policy 
The NBS has been committed to inflationary targeting since 2006. It sets a broad band around the 
targeted CPI inflation rate. The main policy instrument is the two-week repo interest rate. In 
August 2010, gradual relaxation of monetary conditions – pursued since early 2009 – was 
discontinued as inflationary pressures started building up. In a series of rate hikes the interest rate 
was raised from 8% to 12.5%, at present. 
6.  Public finance 
In 2010, the slow and fragile economic recovery prompted adoption of a supplementary budget. 
Revenues remained constrained but continued implementation of a number of corrective 
expenditure measures helped to rein in current spending. Adoption by government of amendments 
to the budget system law and the pension law was an important step towards improving the quality 
of public finances and is in line with the MFA conditionality requirements. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
Privatisation of public enterprises remains the weakest point on the reform agenda. Privatisation of 
socially-owned enterprises back-paddled in 2010 while privatisation of state-owned companies 
continued to be delayed, partly due to the lack of political consensus about restructuring and 
privatisation strategies. 
8.  Financial sector reform 
Serbia’s financial sector has been relatively unscathed by the international financial crisis thanks to 
a set of timely administrative and regulatory repair measures, and also supported by the 
commercial banks commitments under the Vienna Initiative. The banking sector remained 
generally sound and profitable but the relatively high share of bad loans and considerable exposure 
to exchange rate risk are points to watch.  
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EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD COUNTRIES 
4.  ARMENIA 
4.1.  Executive summary 
In 2010, the Armenian economy recovered from the sharp downturn of 14.2% in 2009 
but the pace of recovery remained modest. Real GDP grew by 2.6% driven by recovery 
in services and industry. The fiscal deficit was narrowed to 4.9% of GDP from 7.9% of 
GDP in 2009. However, the recovery in investments and remittances remained fairly 
muted. Thus, despite a slight improvement in the current account deficit, from 16% in 
2009 to 14.6%, a large part of the external financing needs continued to be covered by 
the international community.  
In June 2010, the IMF Board agreed, following Armenia's request, to cancel the Stand-
By Arrangement approved in March 2009 and to replace it with a new longer term 
programme under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the concessional Extended 
Credit Facility (ECF).  
In December 2010, the Commission and the Armenian authorities reached an agreement 
on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the related documents stipulating the 
policy conditions for the disbursement of the macro-financial assistance adopted by the 
Council of the European Union in November 2009 (Decision 2009/890/EC). The 
assistance, consisting of a loan of EUR 65 million and of a grant of EUR 35 million, will 
be released in two instalments over the course of 2011.   
4.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
The Armenian economy experienced a very sharp downturn during the global crisis with 
GDP contracting by 14.2% in 2009. The widening current account deficit and the sharp 
fall in external financing sources, in particular FDI and remittances, exposed a severe 
external financing gap, which could only be filled with foreign assistance. As a result, in 
March 2009, Armenia reached an agreement with the IMF for a 28-month Stand-By 
Arrangement of about USD 532 million, with the total amount of access augmented to 
about USD 820 million in June 2009.  
In 2010, the economic activity started recovering from the deep recession, although the 
pace of recovery was modest. Despite the gradual withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus and 
the unprecedented decline in agricultural output due to adverse weather conditions, GDP 
grew by around 2.6% driven by a recovery in services and industry. Nevertheless, growth 
prospects are still challenging, due to lack of diversification, low-competitiveness and 
the closed borders with two out of four neighbouring countries. 
Despite the increase in metal prices, the trade deficit did not improve significantly and 
remained close to 24% of GDP. In addition, the recovery in investments and remittances 
was fairly muted as growth in Russia, Armenia's main trading partner and source of FDI 
and remittances, moderated compared to previous years. As the effects on the Armenian 
economy of the improvements in the country's external environment appeared to be 
limited, the current account deficit narrowed only to 14.6% of GDP in 2010, from 16% 
of GDP in 2009. Thus, a significant part of the external financing needs in 2010 was 
covered by the international community; a similar situation is expected for 2011.  
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In June 2010, the IMF Executive Board decided upon Armenia's request to cancel the 
Stand-By Arrangement, initially agreed in March 2009, and to replace it with a new 
longer term programme under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the concessional 
Extended Credit Facility (ECF). Under this programme which runs until mid-2013, 
Armenia will get access to IMF funds of about USD 410 million; taking into account the 
disbursements made under the IMF Stand-By Arrangement before June 2010, total 
access of Armenia to IMF resources in 2009-2013 is estimated to reach around USD 950 
million.   
Domestic and external supply shocks, as well as a sharp decline of agricultural output, 
brought the inflation rate to 9.4% year-on-year in December 2010, from 7% in January 
2010. The Central Bank of Armenia left the reference interest rate unchanged at 7.25% 
since May 2010, as the pace of recovery slowed down in the second semester of 2010 
and the inflationary pressures were not demand driven. The Central Bank expects that in 
the second half of 2011, when shocks to food prices recede, inflation will revert to levels 
below 5.5%. In the meantime, it introduced measures to strengthen the effectiveness of 
monetary policy hampered by the high dollarization of the economy. 
The fiscal easing of 2009 was reversed during 2010 on the back of the economic 
recovery. Reflecting government's increased focus on ensuring macroeconomic stability, 
fiscal policy was tightened in 2010. As a result, the fiscal deficit was reduced to 4.9% of 
GDP in 2010 compared to 7.9% of GDP in 2009. The reduction in the fiscal deficit was 
mainly driven by a substantial increase in tax revenues supported by the economic 
recovery, while on the expenditure side the government limited the increase of current 
expenditures and made efforts to achieve better targeting of the anti-poverty and social 
programmes. Nevertheless, the tax-to-GDP ratio deteriorated from 22.8% in January 
2010 to 16.2% in December 2010, indicating high tax evasion and low tax collection 
rates.  
The public debt-to-GDP ratio nearly tripled, from 16.1% of GDP in 2008 to 44% of GDP 
in 2010, as a result of the counter-cyclical measures and the financial assistance from the 
international community in the form of loans. The external debt represents around 90% 
of the total public debt, thus increasing the exchange rate vulnerability and the 
dependence on concessional financing in addressing future financing needs. 
The exchange rate market is small and highly volatile, and the Central Bank of Armenia 
often undertakes foreign exchange interventions to limit the exchange rate volatility. 
Altogether in 2010, the Armenian Dram (AMD) appreciated by 4% against the USD and 
by around 12% against the EUR. Although foreign reserves in December 2010 were at a 
sufficient level (around USD 1.809 billion), a need for reserve built-up remains given the 
persisting high levels of the current account deficit (around 14.6% of GDP in 2010) and 
the weak stream of external inflows to the economy. 
In 2010, the authorities took steps to improve the business climate by simplifying the 
taxpayer reporting system, reducing the discretionary authority of inspectors, introducing 
a legal restriction on public officials from engaging in commercial activities, 
strengthening the competition commission, and further reducing barriers to entry for new 
businesses, including a recent cabinet decree to create a one-stop shop for business 
registration. FDI is estimated to have decreased from 8.4% of GDP in 2009 to around 
6.5% of GDP in 2010.  
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The banking sector is well capitalised and has exhibited resilience to stress-tests. The 
ratio of non-performing loans dropped in August 2010 to 5% from 10% in 2009 as a 
result of the economic recovery. Nevertheless, the financial intermediation remains low, 
with the private sector credit as a share of GDP at around 25%. Lending rates continue to 
be around 18%, partly due to the currency mismatch between deposits (around 68% of 
total deposits are foreign currency denominated) and assets (around 56% of total assets 
are foreign currency denominated).   
4.3.  Structural reforms 
Armenia had a good track record in implementing strong macroeconomic policies and 
structural reforms, which resulted in high growth rates for a series of years prior to the 
economic crisis. However, reform efforts should intensify as the economy remains 
fragile marked with close borders and high current account deficit, while new challenges 
emerge, like the accumulation of public debt and the moderated future growth prospects.  
Structural reform process has gained momentum in the context of the financial assistance 
by the international community, often linked to reforms in certain areas like tax 
administration, social policy, public finances and debt sustainability and financial sector 
stability. 
In the area of tax administration, measures have been taken to reduce corruption and 
increase tax compliance by simplifying and streamlining reporting requirements and by 
applying regulation consistently to all taxpayers through published normative acts 
approved by the Ministry of Finance. An appeal body dealing with legal and procedural 
disputes of taxpayers was also established. Processing time for VAT refund claims was 
brought below 90 days while, in preparation of a fully-functional risk based VAT refund 
processing system, only high-risk VAT refunds will be subject to review. Efforts for 
strengthening tax administration are expected to continue, also because they tax 
administration reform is part of the MFA conditionality. 
In 2010, Armenia continued to tax more heavily the imported tobacco products than the 
domestically produced ones in a way that constitutes a breach of the WTO rules. Both 
IMF and EU MFA programmes are encouraging the removal of this discrimination. In 
October 2010, Armenia passed a law which provided only for gradual removal of this 
discrimination until 2014. In relation to the relevant MFA condition which foresees a 
more rapid removal of this discrimination, the Government adopted in December 2010 a 
Decree on the implementation of tax collection for imported tobacco products aiming at 
correcting this situation. 
To ensure fiscal consolidation and place the debt on a downward path, the authorities re-
introduced and strengthened the Medium Term Expenditure Framework in 2010 and 
adopted a new debt management strategy. The adoption of a new law on internal audit 
will also accelerate efforts for the implementation of a new Public Internal Financial 
Control strategy across the government. The MFA programme supports both these areas 
by three relevant conditions foreseeing the acquisition of a modern debt recording 
system, the improvement of internal functions in the debt management department and 
the methodological development and monitoring of financial management control and 
internal audit across the government.  
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The government improved the targeting of social spending while, in collaboration with 
the World Bank, it is working to improve the coverage of social programmes and 
develop an integrated system for the provision of social protection services. In the field 
of social policies, the reform of the pension system is addressed by the MFA programme. 
Regarding the banking sector, the risk management and supervisory frameworks were 
enhanced, including through contingency planning. Prudential regulations to specifically 
address currency-induced credit risk were issued, including increased loan-loss 
provisioning requirements and higher risk weights in capital requirements for foreign 
currency loans. Progress was also made regarding the establishment of the Committee for 
Financial Stability and the coordination of crisis management banking policies among 
policy makers. Measures to encourage de-dollarisation had some positive results, while 
the new legal framework for insurance and private investment funds was submitted to the 
Parliament. 
Efforts to improve the transmission channels of the monetary policy continued in 2010. 
To this end, preparations for the active management of liquidity and the development of 
transactions in dram-denominated securities advanced.  
4.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Despite the partial recovery of the economy in 2010, total private financing of the 
balance of payments left an external financing gap of around EUR 660 million for the 
period 2010-2011. The MFA programme, put in place in close coordination with IMF, is 
part of the external financing provided to cover Armenia's balance of payment needs in 
2011. It will also support the economic adjustment and reform programme of the 
Armenian authorities designed to achieve sustainable medium-term growth. The 
assistance will consist of a loan of EUR 65 million and of a grant of EUR 35 million and 
will be released in two instalments. The first instalment is expected to be released in 
June/July 2011 following the ratification by the Armenian side of the documents 
pertaining to the assistance, signed in February 2011. The first instalment would amount 
to EUR 40 million (EUR 14 million in grants and EUR 26 million in loans). The second 
instalment, planned for release in autumn 2011, would amount to EUR 60 million (EUR 
21 million in grants and EUR 39 million in loans).  
In addition to the respect of the economic programme agreed between Armenia and the 
IMF, the economic policy conditions for the release of the assistance, also agreed upon in 
2010 (the final agreement was reached in December 2010), comprise specific economic 
policy measures in the areas of public debt management, pension system, public internal 
financial control, external audit, public procurement, tax policy and tax administration, 
and customs policy.  
Several agreed policy measures build on the results of the Operational Assessment (OA) 
that was carried out by the Commission (with the support of external consultants) in 
February 2010. The OA detected a real improvement compared to the situation observed 
during the previous OA, carried out in 2004-2005. An important programme of reforms 
in the area of Public Finance Management (PFM) has been put in place, including the 
implementation of the programme budgeting by all central level bodies and the 
enhancement of the budget preparation process. The external audit function has also been 
developed and the concept of Public Internal Financial Control has been introduced. At 
the same time, the OA formulated a number of recommendations for further actions  such  
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us the completion of the re-organisation of the Ministry of Finance, the strengthening of 
the cash management and the debt management function, the implementation of public 
internal financial control strategy in the context of a new law on internal audit, the 
strengthening of custom administration, the adoption of a new public procurement 
system and the strengthening of the external audit function of the Chamber of Control.. 
These recommendations were indeed taken into account in negotiating the MoU with the 
Armenian authorities. 
In the area of public debt management, the authorities will implement steps in 
developing a debt strategy and put in place a modern debt recording system. In the area 
of public internal financial control (PIFC) and internal audit, the MFA will support the 
broadening of the scope of public internal audits from cash flow controls to organisation, 
management and reporting, as well as the setting-up of a body within the Ministry of 
Finance responsible for methodological development and monitoring of financial 
management control and internal audit across the government. In the area of external 
audit, it will support the adoption by the Chamber of Control of an Action Plan aiming at 
bringing its working methods closer to international standards. The condition of the MFA 
programme in the area of public procurement foresees the harmonisation of Armenia's 
legislation with the EU directives and international standards.  
In addition to Public Finance Management proper, several conditions refer to more 
structural questions in the broad area of public finances. They include an Action Plan for 
upgrading tax administration in several key areas accompanied by respective budget 
allocations and steps to enhance tax collection for fiscal consolidation and debt 
sustainability purposes, and the preparation of legislation reforming the pension system 
and introducing a privately funded pillar. 
Finally, two trade-relevant measures support Armenia's efforts to create an open and 
transparent trading environment. The first condition refers to the need for Armenia to 
apply a non-discriminatory taxation to the domestically produced and imported tobacco 
products. The second condition reflects the need to reform the customs valuation system 
in a way that it is based on the transaction values and the proper application of the WTO 
rules. This condition entails the progressive development of risk-based post-clearance 
valuation controls. 
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ARMENIA - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1. Price liberalisation 
Prices are largely free but there are fixed oligopolistic conditions in many sectors of the 
economy. 
2. Trade regime 
Armenia is a WTO member since 2003. Tariff structure is simple, all tariffs are bound and the 
applied average tariff is 2.7%. Customs procedures have improved but customs clearance 
remains slow and sometimes non-transparent due to the extensive use of 'reference' values in 
breach of WTO rules. Problems remain regarding technical barriers to trade and in the sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary regulations. A Decree was adopted aiming to lift the discriminatory tax 
treatment for tobacco products. Taxation of beverages was still in breach to WTO rules. 
Armenia qualified for the EU GSP+. EU is ready to discuss the launching of DCFTA 
negotiations with Armenia once the country meets a number of pre-conditions.   
3. Exchange rate regime 
After the March 2009 devaluation of the Armenian dram, the central bank announced the 
adoption of a free floating exchange rate regime. However, the exchange rate market is small 
and highly volatile, and the central bank often undertakes foreign exchange interventions to 
limit exchange rate volatility. In 2010, the Central Bank of Armenia committed to intervene 
without contradicting fundamental market trends while communicating clearly its intervention 
policy to avoid creating market misperceptions. 
4. Foreign direct investment 
Overall, Armenia has a liberal trade and investment regime. The country's land-locked 
geographical position with two closed borders and the oligarchic structure of the private sector 
hampers growth potential and competitiveness which deteriorated in 2010. Investors' protection, 
payment of taxes, access to finance and corruption appear as points of concern.   
5. Monetary policy 
The Central Bank of Armenia follows an inflation targeting regime. Efforts to improve the 
transmission channels of the monetary policy continued in 2010.  
6. Public Finances and Taxation 
While public expenditure management is strong there is considerable room for improvement in 
the field of public internal financial control (PIFC). To this end the authorities adopted a new 
PIFC strategy and a new law for Internal Audit. They also reverted to the Medium-Term 
Expenditure framework abandoned during the economic crisis. Revenue collection in 2010 did 
not benefit substantially from the economic recovery resulting to a low tax-to-GDP ratio of 
16.2%.   
7. Privatisation and Enterprise Restructuring 
During the 1990's and early 2000's most of the small and medium-sized enterprises had been 
privatised. Also, the electric power distribution system was privatised and bought by a Russian 
company in 2005. Plans to privatise some remaining smaller enterprises seem to have been 
delayed as a result of the economic crisis. 
8. Financial Sector 
The banking sector in Armenia is relatively small (banking assets represent around 45% of 
GDP) but well capitalised and deposit-funded. It consists mainly of private banks. Nevertheless, 
financial intermediation remains low. The Central Bank of Armenia enhanced the risk 
management and supervisory frameworks in the banking sector, including contingency 
planning. Prudential regulations on higher capital and provisioning requirements on foreign 
currency loans were issued. Future efforts should focus not only on enhancing financial 
stability but also on facing obstacles to credit growth and financial intermediation.  
27 
5.  GEORGIA 
5.1.  Executive summary 
Following the double shock of the military conflict with Russia of August 2008 and the 
2008-2009 global crisis, the Georgian economy entered a recovery path in 2010. In line 
with its commitments, the country has maintained a prudent fiscal and monetary policy 
stance, increased the flexibility of its exchange rate and continued to make progress with 
its structural reform agenda. However, due to a limited recovery in FDI inflows and a 
still very large current account deficit, Georgia's external position has remained 
vulnerable. The country has remained dependent on external official financing, including 
EU macro-financial assistance. 
Since September 2008, Georgia has been implementing an economic adjustment 
programme agreed with the IMF and supported by IMF funding. The programme 
remained fully on track during 2010. In January 2011, the IMF Executive Board 
completed successfully the seventh and the eighth programme reviews. However, the 
authorities indicated that they did not intend to draw the instalment that became 
available. At the same time, the authorities plan to conclude a follow-up Stand-By 
Arrangement with the IMF after the current SBA expires in June 2011. 
In 2010, the first macro-financial assistance (MFA) operation to Georgia approved by the 
Council in November 2009 was implemented successfully. The assistance, amounting to 
EUR 46 million in the form of grants, was part of a pledge of two possible EU funded 
MFA operations of the same amount made by the European Commission at the 
International Donors' Conference of October 2008. The approval of the second MFA was 
conditional on the continued existence of external financing needs over and above those 
covered by the IMF arrangement. After thorough assessment of external financing needs 
of Georgia, the Commission considered that the activation of the second part of the MFA 
pledged in 2008 was warranted and adopted a proposal for further MFA in the amount of 
EUR 46 million (half of it in grants and half of it in loans) on 13 January 2011. The joint 
European Parliament and Council Decision is expected for June-July 2011. 
5.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Following the double shock of the military conflict with Russia of August 2008 and the 
2008-2009 global crisis, the year 2010 saw a revival of economic activity. After a 
contraction of activity by 3.8% in 2009, real GDP grew by 6.3% in 2010. The labour 
market has profited only marginally from the economic recovery, however: the 
unemployment rate remained high: it decreased by only 2 percentage points from its 
2009 height of almost 17%.  
On the back of the economic recovery, the government tightened its budgetary and 
monetary policies. In line with the government commitment in the framework of the IMF 
Stand-By Arrangement and of the ENP Action Plan, the fiscal deficit was reduced from 
9.2% of GDP in 2009 to 6.6% in 2010. Expenditure containment accompanied by a 
number of spending cuts has been the main means to achieve this fiscal consolidation, 
even if the recovering tax revenues were also an important factor. The tax revenue 
increased by almost 10% in comparison to 2009 thus more than compensating tax 
revenue fall-out of the previous year. The tightening of the monetary policy began in 
summer to keep inflation under control, with the key policy interest rate having been  
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increased by 3 percentage points between May 2010 and February 2011. The authorities 
also increased reserve requirements. However, while CPI inflation in 2010 was 7.1% on 
average, it picked up at the end of 2010 reaching 11.2%. One of the reasons for the 
strong increase in inflation is the fact that almost half of the CPI basket in Georgia 
consists of food items, so that increases in cereals prices, especially those of wheat, 
previously imported from Russia, feed into the higher CPI. To find a solution to high 
food prices and reduce Georgia's dependency on certain key agricultural exports, such as 
wheat, the authorities reviewed their agricultural policy announcing a greater political 
commitment to promote growth and jobs in the agricultural sector. 
While the economic recovery has taken hold, the external economic situation remains 
vulnerable as the financing of the large current account deficit remains uncertain. By 
weakening domestic demand, the crisis contributed to a halving of the current account 
deficit in 2009. However, the deficit remains very large, at 9.9% of GDP in 2010, and it 
is expected to remain similarly high in 2011. The trade deficit, which reached 22.2% of 
GDP in 2010, has been the main driver of the large current account deficit. Georgia's 
exports continue to suffer from the trade embargo imposed by Russia in 2006 and 
extended in 2008. Georgia's exports to the EU countries have remained low and the 
possibilities offered by the GSP+ remain under-exploited. While a certain trade re-
orientation and changes in export profile have recently taken place, Georgia's exports 
continue to lack diversification. Overall, the Georgian export performance remains far 
below its potential.  
FDI inflows were negatively affected by the crisis and declined in 2010 in comparison to 
the previous year. Thus, FDI inflows reached USD 550 million thus remaining 
substantially below the 2009 figure of USD 750 million. This disappointing performance 
of FDI inflows puts at risk the financing of the current account and the build up of 
international currency reserves and shows that foreign investor confidence, which 
experienced a dramatic blow due to the conflict with Russia in 2008, has still not 
returned. It also reflects the loss of steam of the privatisation process, as many of the 
most attractive state companies and assets have already been sold. At the same time, 
much of the official donor financing agreed at the 2008 International Donors' Conference 
has already been disbursed as it was mostly frontloaded. A further vulnerability in the 
balance of payments relates to the fast increasing external public debt that represented in 
2010 34.1% of GDP (up from 16.8% of GDP in 2007), and a significant need for a debt 
roll-over in the coming years. Substantial external debt repayment obligations are 
expected to become due in 2013-2015. A strong bunching of repayments foreseen for 
2013 (USD 750 million) reflects the repayment of the Eurobond of USD 500 million 
issued in 2008 and substantial repurchases under the IMF’s Stand-By Arrangement. To 
improve the amortisation profile and reduce the bunching of debt repayments in 2013, 
the authorities accessed the international capital markets in early April 2011. Georgia 
issued a Eurobond of USD 500 million with a ten-year maturity and in parallel redeemed 
USD 417 million of the existing Eurobond. Despite the improved creditworthiness in 
international capital markets, Georgia's balance of payments situation remains 
vulnerable. 
In September 2008, the IMF approved an 18-month Stand-By Arrangement for Georgia, 
worth USD 750 million. In August 2009, the Stand-By Arrangement was extended until 
14 June 2011 and the financing package increased, bringing the total Stand-By 
Arrangement programme to USD 1.17 billion. The programme remained fully on track 
during 2010. In January 2011, the IMF Executive Board completed successfully the  
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seventh and the eighth programme reviews. However, the authorities indicated that they 
did not intend to draw the instalment of around USD 153 million that became available. 
At the same time, the authorities have indicated their interest to conclude a follow-up 
Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF after the current SBA expires in June 2011. 
Consistent with the commitment of the monetary authorities within the IMF Stand-By 
Arrangement to increase the exchange rate flexibility, the National Bank of Georgia 
continued its less interventionist exchange rate policy. The depreciation trend against the 
USD during the first half of the year reversed in June, with the appreciation against the 
USD allowing for a slight recovery in foreign reserves. However, although gross 
international reserves have recovered from a trough of USD 1.5 billion reached during 
the crisis to USD 2.7 billion by end March 2011, they remained at a suboptimal level, 
particularly since this recovery has partly been achieved by borrowing from the IMF. 
Despite a certain improvement at the end of 2010, net international reserves remained 
low, at USD 882 million in December 2010.  
5.3.  Structural reforms 
Since the 2003 Rose Revolution Georgia has made significant progress in a number of 
legal and regulatory reforms. The tax system has been simplified and public finance 
management brought closer to international practices. Customs regime has been 
liberalised, while important anti-corruption measures have been taken and the regulatory 
business environment has substantially improved. In 2010, the reform efforts were 
intensified in some areas, although others continued to lag behind the ambitious reform 
plans of the government.  
One policy field that has been at the heart of government's reform efforts has been public 
finance management. In line with the policy conditionality of the macro-financial 
assistance, internal and external audit reforms continued, as well as reforms in the field 
of budget formulation and public procurement. Thus, the law on Internal Audit and 
Inspection introducing internal audit units in individual ministries was approved by the 
Parliament in March 2010, while the Action Plan on internal audit for 2010 was adopted 
by the government in May 2010. In April 2010, the Chamber of Control adopted a two-
year capacity development plan that foresees the introduction of compliance audit 
manuals, quality control systems, staff-recruitment and targeted training. In the area of 
budget preparation, the Budget System Law was replaced by a more comprehensive 
Budget Code in January 2010. To advance the introduction of the programme-based 
budgeting, a decree outlining a three-year government plan was signed in March 2010. 
Pilot projects for programme-based budgeting were implemented in six line ministries. In 
public procurement, the law was amended to better reflect the introduction of the e-
procurement mode in December 2010. Furthermore, a dispute review mechanism was 
established in December 2010. Georgia also made some progress in the area of public 
revenue management. A new, simplified Tax Code was approved in September 2010, 
electronic filing of tax returns and VAT invoices was implemented, while tax payment 
control and customs management systems have been reformed to reflect a more risk-
based policy approach of the authorities. 
In the area of trade and of trade-related regulatory reforms, progress was rather limited. 
A dialogue with the EU on the preparation for the start of negotiations on a deep and 
comprehensive free trade area continued but reforms in key trade-related regulatory and 
institutional reforms, such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, technical regulations  
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and competition policy have remained insufficient to allow the launching of the 
negotiations.  
In the area of prudential financial policy, the decision to merge  the Financial 
Supervision Agency with the National Bank of Georgia in December 2009 and appointed 
the National Bank as the single regulator of financial sector was further implemented in 
2010. The supervision is gradually moving towards a risk-based system.  
In the field of statistics, a new law ensuring a higher independence of the National 
Statistical Office entered into force in February 2010. However, financial resources of 
the Statistical Office remained very limited putting at risk the quality of statistical data in 
the country. 
Georgia's company law introduced an efficient registration system for new enterprises 
that allows a company to register within half a day. As far as business climate is 
concerned, according to the World Bank's 'Doing Business' indicators, Georgia ranked 
12
th globally, in particular due to improvement in access to credit and investor protection.  
5.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The EU Council Decision of 30 November 2009 provided macro-financial assistance 
(MFA) to Georgia amounting to EUR 46 million, in grants. This assistance was part of a 
pledge of two possible EU funded MFA operations of the same amount made by the 
European Commission at the International Donors' Conference of October 2008. This 
pledge was part of a comprehensive Community package of up to EUR 500 million to 
support Georgia's economic recovery in the aftermath of the August 2008 armed conflict 
with Russia. It supported the Stand-By Arrangement agreed by the Georgian government 
with the IMF to help the country through the global crisis. The Union's MFA contributed 
to covering Georgia's external financing needs in 2009-2010. The Commission disbursed 
the first tranche of the assistance of EUR 23 million in two parts amounting to EUR 15.3 
million and EUR 7.7 million in December 2009 and in January 2010, respectively. The 
second tranche of EUR 23 million was disbursed in August 2010.  
The approval of the second MFA operation was conditional on the continued existence of 
external financing needs over and above those covered by the IMF arrangement. In a 
letter from 10 May 2010, the Georgian Minister of Finance requested the activation of 
the second part of the EC pledge, amounting to EUR 46 million. After thorough 
assessment of external financing needs of Georgia the Commission considered that the 
activation of the second part of the MFA pledged in 2008 was warranted and adopted its 
proposal on 13 January 2011. The joint European Parliament and Council Decision is 
expected for June-July 2011. 
The proposed assistance would be provided half in grants and half in loans. The new 
MFA will support the economic reform agenda of the government. It would promote 
policy measures to strengthen public finance management (building on those of the 
previous operation and of the EU's sectoral budgetary support operation), as well as 
measures to foster economic and financial integration with the EU, in particular by 
exploiting the potential offered by the future Association Agreement, which aims at 
concluding a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between the two parties. 
In the context of the preparation of the new MFA operation, the Commission conducted 
at the end of 2010 an operational assessment of the financial procedures and circuits. The  
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OA is being finalised. Its initial findings suggest that significant efforts have been made 
in Georgia since the OA conducted in 2004-2005 to build a functional and transparent 
public finance management system, compliant with international standards. This reform, 
which was supported by the conditionality of the MFA operation implemented in 2009-
2010, has translated in progress in the areas of public procurement, programme-based 
budgeting as well as external audit. Also, the customs and tax environment has been 
simplified. Yet, the OA report noted a need for further measures in areas including 
budget planning, debt management, public internal financial control, external audit and 
public procurement. 
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GEORGIA - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1. Price liberalisation  
Prices are largely free. 
2. Trade regime  
Liberal trade policy. Import tariffs have been abolished on around 90% of products. In 
September 2006, the number of tariff bands on imported goods was reduced from 16 to three. 
The maximum tariff of 12% is applied to those agricultural products and building materials 
which compete with domestic goods. The average weighted tariff is estimated to be 1.5%. 
Non-tariff barriers allowed for environmental, security and health reasons only. There are no 
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports.  
Since December 2005, under the EU Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), Georgia 
benefits from the generous tariff preferences of the special incentive arrangement for 
sustainable development and good governance covering 7200 items, the GSP+. Georgia's 
GSP+ utilisation rate has been declining. In May 2010, the mandate for the negotiations of the 
Association Agreement between the EU and Georgia was approved. In the area of trade, the 
new agreement would foresee the establishment of deep and comprehensive free trade area, 
once the necessary conditions are met.  
3. Exchange regime 
Floating exchange rate of the lari with limited official intervention by the National Bank of 
Georgia. There are no restrictions on current international transactions in conformity with 
Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. 
4. Foreign direct investment 
Adequate overall legislation. Unlimited repatriation of capital and profits.  
5. Monetary policy 
Central Bank's main policy objective is the price stability. The stated inflation target of the 
monetary authorities is 6%. However, in practice, stability of the external value of the lari 
against the USD seems to take precedence over the aim of domestic inflation control.  
6. Public finances and taxation 
Public finance management system is largely appropriate. Significant reform efforts have been 
made allowing to build a solid foundation for a functional and transparent public finance 
management system. A new tax and customs code was introduced as well as a number of 
reforms in external and internal audit, programme-based budgeting and public procurement. 
Georgia has double taxation agreements with 26 countries, including 19 EU Member States.  
8. Privatisation and enterprise restructuring   
The majority of state-owned enterprises have been privatised. Privatisation receipts amounted 
to 3.7% of GDP in 2008, to 2% in 2009 and 1.1% in 2010. 
7. Financial Sector  
There are 15 banks in Georgia with foreign investors holding significant stakes in the 
Georgian banking industry. The two largest foreign banks are Société Générale's subsidiary 
Bank Republic (holding around 11% of the market in terms of deposits) and HSBC. Russia’s 
Vneshtorgbank, the German Procredit, the Kazakh Turan Alem Bank and the Armenian 
Cascade Bank are also present. The share of non-performing loans, defined as overdue by 
more than 90 days, has remained low reaching 5.4% in early 2011. Capital adequacy and 
provisioning rules in Georgia are more conservative than Basel standards. Since December 
2009, the National Bank of Georgia is the single supervisor of Georgia's financial sector. It is 
currently introducing risk-based bank supervision in line with Basel II. 
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6.  MOLDOVA 
6.1.  Executive summary 
The global crisis hit the Moldovan economy hard. GDP contracted by 6 % in 2009, with 
investment and remittances falling by around 30%, which exposed a severe external 
financing gap. In 2010, the Moldovan economy started to recover at a rapid pace and real 
GDP grew by 6.9% of GDP. Private consumption and investment rose again, the latter at 
a double-digit growth rate, while the negative external demand subtracted from growth. 
The recovery was broad based, with agriculture, industry and services all growing after 
contractions in 2009. Although exports rebounded strongly they were outpaced by 
imports and together with the narrow export base meant that the persistently high trade 
deficit expanded as a share of GDP. The increase was however offset by a rise in 
remittances and labour income, and the current account deficit slightly decreased as a 
share of GDP. FDI inflows are estimated to have risen to about 3.5% of GDP in 2010. 
Long-term external borrowing also increased but was supported by the loan 
disbursements under the IMF programme. The uncertainty surrounding private external 
financing implies that international donor support remains important for maintaining 
macro-economic stability and supporting the government's reform agenda. 
The incoming governments' structural reform priorities are broadly those of the previous 
administration but political uncertainty has somewhat hampered progress. The incoming 
government's main priorities are to consolidate and improve the efficiency and 
sustainability of public finances, partly by overhauling the civil service, improve the 
environment for businesses, in particular export oriented businesses, by reducing the 
number of business licences, permits and authorisations, to support small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), and to improve education and health. 
In October 2010, the EU co-legislators adopted a decision to grant Moldova macro-
financial assistance of EUR 90 million. The assistance, in the form of grants, is to be 
disbursed in three tranches in 2010 and 2011. The first tranche of EUR 40 million was 
disbursed at the end of December 2010. The disbursement of the first tranche was made 
possible by the agreement between the Commission and the authorities on the economic 
policy conditions of the assistance reached in December 2010. The second and third 
tranches, of EUR 20 million and EUR 30 million respectively, should be disbursed at the 
end of the second and fourth quarters of 2011. 
6.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
The global crisis hit the Moldovan economy hard. GDP contracted by 6% in 2009, with 
investment and remittances falling by around 30%. The sharp fall in external financing 
sources exposed a severe external financing gap. On 29 January 2010, the IMF agreed to 
provide financial assistance of SDR 369.6 million (EUR 420 million) spread over three 
years. The IMF financing is provided under the Fund's Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and 
the concessional Extended Credit Facility (ECF). On 16 July 2010, the IMF completed 
the first of a series of semi-annual reviews of the ECF-EFF arrangement. The review 
concluded that the lending programme is on track and that current policies will continue 
to stabilise the economy and support the recovery. All IMF performance criteria and 
indicative targets were met. The positive review triggered the second disbursement of 
SDR 60 million. The second IMF review was completed in April 2011 and the next 
tranche of SDR 50 million was disbursed.  
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In 2010, the Moldovan economy began to recover. Real GDP grew by 6.9% of GDP. 
Private consumption and investment started to rise again although the external negative 
external demand subtracted from growth. On a sectoral basis, the recovery was broad 
based with agriculture, industry and services all growing after contractions in 2009. 
Although exports rebounded strongly they were outpaced by imports and together with 
narrow export base meant that the persistently high trade deficit expanded from 36% of 
GDP in 2009 to an estimated 38% of GDP in 2010. The increase   was however offset by 
a rise in remittances and labour income and the current account deficit slightly declined 
from 8.5% of GDP in 2009 to 8.3% of GDP in 2010.  FDI inflows are estimated to have 
risen to 3.5% of GDP from 1.5% in 2009. Long-term external borrowing increased 
although supported by the loan disbursements under the IMF programme. The 
uncertainty surrounding private external financing implies that international donor 
support remains important for maintaining macro-economic stability and supporting the 
government's reform agenda. 
After decreasing rapidly in 2009, inflation edged up again through 2010 mainly due to 
cost push pressures as credit and domestic demand remained subdued. In particular, 
inflation was driven up by increases in food prices and energy tariffs, the depreciation of 
the leu, and higher excise rates. The CPI rose to 8.1% at the end of 2010. In response to 
mounting inflationary pressure, the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) reversed the trend 
of monetary easing by raising the base lending rate twice in the first quarter of 2010, to 
7%. The NBM adopted a more explicit policy of inflation-targeting in 2010, with a target 
of 5% ±1.5 percentage point for the end of 2010. The NBM’s policies have started to be 
gauged in quarterly monetary policy reports, the first of which was published in February 
2010.  
The banking system is well capitalised with a capital adequacy ratio of about 30% as of 
March 2011. The large amount of non-performing loans declined from 16.4% in 2009 to 
10.7% in the first quarter of 2011, supported by the resumption in private credit growth. 
The growth rate of private credit turned positive to about 13% in 2010 and jumped to 
around 38% in January 2011 based on higher FX lending to the corporate sector and a 
reduction of leu lending rates. Lending rates remain high at above 15% p.a. while the 
spread between lending and deposit rates increased significantly in the crisis. In addition, 
a high proportion of foreign currency denominated loans (43%) and deposits (46%) 
heighten exchange rate vulnerability.   
Unemployment has continued to rise compared to 2008 and 2009 and reached about 
7.4% of the labour force (ILO definition) in 2010. The activity rate declined to less than 
42% thus being very low on account of the large segment of the population working 
abroad.   Job losses were reported in agriculture, industry, and catering, while there were 
increases in transport, communications, and construction.  As Moldova is relatively poor, 
the recession affected heavily the living standards of the population. The impact was 
however alleviated by the multilateral and bilateral official financing which supported 
domestic demand and set the stage for the economic recovery. After having dropped by 
around 6% in euro terms in 2009, GDP per capita bounced back by about 12% in 2010. 
Still, it only reached a low level of about 1,230 euro. 
The authorities have focused fiscal and monetary policy on ensuring macroeconomic 
stability and fiscal consolidation. Fiscal policy was significantly tightened in 2010. The 
government reduced the deficit in 2010 to 2.5% of GDP from 6.3% in 2009. The 
reduction was driven by cuts in general public services and reduced debt servicing costs,  
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as well as regulatory rises in taxation that contributed to an increase in revenue of 17% 
compared to 2009. The 2010 budget included increases in VAT on gas, and higher excise 
duty on tobacco products, luxury cars, alcoholic beverages and perfumes. Government 
debt remained stable at 25.2% of GDP.  
In the context of efforts by international donors to put the economy on a reform path, the 
government has adopted a wide-ranging medium-term structural reform programme 
("The Economic Stabilisation and Recovery Programme for 2009-2011") supported by 
multilateral and bilateral donors. In the medium term, the government aims at gradually 
narrowing the budget deficit, mainly through an adjustment of current expenditure on 
wages, goods and services, and subsidies. The government is also aiming at reforming 
the civil service and the judiciary; combating corruption; reducing and streamlining 
business administration; providing greater support to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, and improving education and health. 
The major near-term challenge for Moldova is how to expand growth enhancing public 
spending and maintain basic living standards while at the same time consolidate public 
finances. In order to protect the most vulnerable groups from the measures to increase 
utility tariffs and reduce subsidies, the government has put in place targeted 
compensation schemes for heating costs for families receiving social assistance, low 
wage public sector workers, and for pensioners on low incomes. In line with the EU 
Action Plan objective of ensuring the sustainability of public finances, reforms were 
agreed to the social insurance systems which have tightened sick leave allowances and 
pulled back early retirement schemes. The authorities also adopted a strategy to improve 
tax collection, including risk-based auditing, targeting economic agents outside the 
formal economy, and combating tax evasion. 
6.3.  Structural reforms 
The incoming governments' structural reform priorities are broadly those of the previous 
administration but political uncertainty has somewhat hampered progress and 
expectations were not always met. As indicated already, the incoming government's main 
priorities are to consolidate and improve the efficiency and sustainability of public 
finances, partly by overhauling the civil service, to improve the environment for 
businesses, in particular export oriented businesses, by reducing the number of business 
licences, permits and authorisations, to support small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), and to improve education and health. 
With respect to fiscal policy, the government is aiming to reduce the fiscal deficit, at a 
pace depending on the economy's speed of recovery. To achieve the consolidation, the 
government is aiming to cut the public sector wage bill, reduce non-essential current 
spending, and increase tax revenue by improving tax administration, i.e. broadening the 
tax base and reducing the level of fraud and tax evasion. In 2010, the government 
intensified efforts to reform public procurement and public internal financial control 
(PIFC), including through the introduction of internal audit units and approval of core 
PIFC legislation. These measures are in line with the structural reform criteria of the 
MFA. The government also introduced new legislation to improve the financial 
sustainability of the social insurance system, by making sick leave benefits more 
incentive-compatible by assigning the responsibility for the first day of sick leave to the 
employee and the second day to the employer, and by phasing out early retirement  
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privileges for civil servants, judges and prosecutors. In future, the government intends to 
introduce a performance-based salary system for all public sector employees.  
The government has continued to take actions to create an investment- and export-
friendly business environment, advance liberalization and deregulation, and prepare for 
further privatisations. The government is planning to privatise state owned assets in the 
telecommunications, rail and air sectors, and is working with the World Bank and the 
IMF on a restructuring plan for the energy sector. The National Agency for Energy 
Regulation (ANRE), in accordance with its mandate and methodology, has increased 
tariffs over the past few years to cost-recovery levels. The government also intends to 
deregulate wages in state run utility companies by removing indexation to the national 
minimum wage. 
With respect to reforming the environment for businesses, a number of formal and 
informal export and import restrictions were removed in 2010. The government also 
simplified licensing requirements, and procedures for business registration and 
liquidation. The VAT regime was simplified by extending nationally the option to 
receive VAT refunds for purchases of investment goods effective from 2011. Business 
overhead costs were lowered by reducing the frequency of inspections of enterprises by 
state agencies and by simplifying access to digital signatures. In order to promote trade, 
one-stop-shop business services linked to customs administration were extended. The 
government continued to improve IT facilities to enable automated data exchange and 
electronic document processing. In order to stimulate private investment and strengthen 
the protection of investors’ rights, the government intends to review investment-related 
legislation, including the laws on joint stock companies, entrepreneurship and capital 
markets. The government also intends to amend the Land Code and other related 
legislation to simplify the procedure of converting agricultural land for other business 
use. 
In order to increase efficiency in the education sector, the government passed a decision 
to merge several schools. It is planning further consolidation and also intends to allow 
schools to generate revenue from their own assets. The proceeds from efficiency gains 
will be reinvested in order to raise the quality of the education sector. 
6.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
A Legislative Decision (938/2010/EU) to provide EUR 90 million of macro-financial 
assistance in grant aid to Moldova was adopted on 20 October 2010. The EU MFA is to 
be disbursed in three tranches in 2010 and 2011. The first tranche of EUR 40 million was 
disbursed at the end of December 2010. The second and third tranches, of EUR 20 
million and EUR 30 million respectively, should be disbursed at the end of the second 
and fourth quarters of 2011. 
EU MFA is part of an international financing package put in place to support the 
Republic of Moldova's efforts to meet substantial external financing needs and cover a 
sharp deterioration in public finances in the context of the global economic crisis. EU 
MFA will complement financial resources provided by (i) the IMF; (ii) the World Bank 
(WB) which is undertaking additional operations aimed mainly at supporting growth-
enhancing structural reforms; (iii) other multilateral creditors and official bilateral 
donors; and (iv) the EU, in the form of EIB loans and sectoral budget support 
programmes financed under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.   
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The objective of EU MFA is to help bridge the external financing gap and to bring about 
structural reforms which will stabilise the Moldovan economy and raise potential growth. 
In this respect, EU MFA is tied to a number of structural reform criteria. The main 
criteria included in the Memorandum of Understanding, agreed with the authorities in 
December 2010, are public finances and public finance reforms, financial stability and 
financial sector reforms, and legislative and regulatory convergence with the EU. 
EU MFA is mainly tied to a number of actions to reform public finance management and 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. They include the 
preparation of a new law on public finances, the publication of a Medium-Term 
Budgetary Framework (MTBF) for the period 2012-2014 to improve budgetary planning, 
the preparation of a census of all public sector employees to improve control over public 
sector wage costs. Also, the Ministry of Finance will approve a new unified Chart of 
Accounts for the whole public sector, put in place a new Financial Management 
Information System (FMIS), and elaborate, approve, and publish a medium-term debt 
management strategy for the period 2012-2014, also covering the terms of settlement of 
outstanding government bonds held by the National Bank of Moldova. Finally, the 
Public Procurement Agency will receive new powers and put forward regulations and 
standards to bring public procurement closer to EU standards. 
EU MFA is also tied to several actions to reform the financial sector. The government 
will introduce legislation to define the regulatory and supervisory responsibilities for 
leasing and micro-credit institutions. The Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of 
Moldova will jointly elaborate a medium-term action plan to ensure the sufficient 
capitalisation of the National Bank of Moldova. The government, in cooperation with the 
National Bank of Moldova, will modify Central Bank legislation to ensure its compliance 
with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular with respect to 
central bank independence and restriction on monetary financing. 
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MOLDOVA – SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1. Price Liberalisation 
Prices are regulated on utilities and some public services. There are price controls on electricity, 
natural gas, water supply and sanitation, housing and medical services, rail and urban passenger 
transport, and postal services.  
2. Trade regime 
Moldova (a WTO member since 2001) has a liberal trade regime. Since 2006, Moldova has 
been a member of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA); it has also concluded 
bilateral free trade agreements with all CIS countries but Tajikistan. Since March 1, 2008 
Moldova has benefited from Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP+) with the EU as a result of 
implementation of sustainable development, good governance policies and customs 
administration. Moldova started negotiations with the EU on an Association Agreement in 
January 2010 including the establishment of a DCFTA. Moldova does not impose any taxes, 
quotas or other restrictions on exports while custom tariffs are applied to around 50% of 
imported products. No tariffs are applied to products originating from the EU and from CEFTA, 
up to quota limits agreed within CEFTA. The average weighted customs tariff is 4.3%. The 
average tariff on agricultural products is 12.7% and 3.9% on industrial products. 
3. Exchange regime 
The exchange rate regime has been a managed float since 2008. The NBM intervenes in the 
domestic foreign exchange interbank market in order to smooth out sharp fluctuations of the 
Moldovan leu against the US dollar. The NBM publishes information on its interventions. 
4. Foreign Direct Investment 
There are no controls on inward investment. Net FDI inflows amounted to an estimated 3.5% of 
GDP in 2010. Before the global economic crisis FDI inflows were considerably higher, at 
around 11.5% of GDP in 2008. 
5. Monetary policy 
The primary objective of monetary policy is price stability. The central bank adopts an annual 
inflation target and uses the base interest rate as the main policy instrument. In January 2010, 
the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) announced an inflation target of 5 percent with a narrow 
±1.5 percent deviation band. 
6. Public Finances and Taxation 
The Moldovan government is implementing several measures to consolidate public finances, in 
particular to increase tax revenue and to increase the efficiency of public expenditure, notably 
by improving public finance management and rationalising public sector employment. 
Moldova’s tax rates have been significantly reduced in recent years. The 2008 budget 
simplified income tax by cutting the number of bands from three to two (with top rate of 22%); 
it also eliminated corporate income tax except for distributed profits and dividends. Tax 
revenue amounted to approximately 38% of GDP in 2010. 
7. Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
Moldova has gradually sought to privatize state owned assets and enterprises. The private sector 
accounts for around 60% of GDP. Privatisation revenues rose to 0.5% of GDP in 2010 from 
0.1% of GDP in 2009. One of the government's current priorities is energy sector reform. 
8. Financial sector 
Moldova's bank-based financial system remains generally sound. The sector was largely 
insulated from the global financial crisis due to limited access of local banks to international 
capital markets, but deposits fell and the asset quality deteriorated at the beginning of the crisis. 
Partly as a result of supportive measures from the NBM, commercial banks have remained 
liquid and adequately capitalized although lending to the economy has fallen significantly. 
Recently, lending to the private sector resumed its positive trend while the share of non-
performing loans fell from around 17% in April 2010 to about 11% in March 2011.  
39 
7.  UKRAINE 
7.1.  Executive summary 
Ukraine’s economy entered a phase of recovery in 2010. This, along with a new IMF 
Stand-By Arrangement concluded in July 2010, helped the newly formed executive to 
consolidate the general macroeconomic policy framework. Notably, 2010 saw a return to 
economic growth, lower domestic inflation, a stabilisation of the hryvnia against the US 
dollar and other foreign currencies, a reversal of the losses of foreign exchange reserves 
witnessed in 2009 and a narrowing of the public deficit. However, the rebound in 
domestic investment has remained timid, while the current account has swung back into 
deficit, raising some doubts about the medium-term sustainability of the recovery.  
In terms of structural reforms, the government implemented a significant increase in 
retail energy prices, strengthened central bank independence and started working on a 
pension reform in 2010; all of these measures formed part of the IMF’s conditionality. 
However, a key weakness in Ukraine remains the operating environment for businesses, 
which is hampered by non-transparent bureaucratic procedures, a lack of administrative 
implementation and enforcement capacity and continued constraints in companies’ 
access to credit. 
Against the backdrop of a persistent external financing gap and in order to support the 
economic reform process in the country, the European Commission started to negotiate 
with the Ukrainian authorities in July 2010 an MFA loan package of up to EUR 610 
million, based on the Decisions of 2002 (EUR 110 million) and 2010 (EUR 500 million). 
Unfortunately, progress in these negotiations has been slow, reflecting reluctance on the 
part of the authorities to make clear commitments in some key reform areas, including 
external audit, VAT refund arrears and energy sector reform. Any disbursements of MFA 
in 2011 are conditional on the successful conclusions of these negotiations, as well as 
continued drawings on IMF support by Ukraine under its current Stand-By Arrangement 
on the basis of positive assessments by the IMF of the country’s reform progress.  
7.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Ukraine was among the EU neighbourhood countries hardest hit by the global economic 
and financial crisis. From late 2008, it suffered a parallel balance-of-payments and 
banking crisis, and output contracted by 15% in 2009. However, in 2010 Ukraine’s 
economic fortunes improved in parallel with the rebound in much of the rest of the world 
and in the wake of a stabilisation in the domestic political situation following the 
presidential election early in the year and the subsequent formation of a majority 
government.  
The Ukrainian recovery was initially export-led, but spread to domestic demand over the 
course of 2010. Official labour market figures reflect this upturn: unemployment (ILO 
methodology) declined from 9.6% in 2009 to 8.8% in 2010, while the number of jobs 
rose slightly (0.4%). As a consequence of an improved economic and labour market 
situation, household consumption, rising by 7.0% in real terms, turned into the mainstay 
of economic growth in 2010, which came to 4.2%.  
Investment also recovered in 2010, albeit only in the second half of the year and 
relatively timidly (4.9% in 2010) considering the favourable base effect stemming from  
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its drastic contraction during the crisis (-50.5% in 2009). This hesitant recovery in 
investment may in part reflect severe problems in the operating environment for 
companies, along with persistent difficulties with access to financing. Loans by domestic 
banks to non-financial companies barely increased in real terms in 2010, as the Ukrainian 
banking system continued to grapple with a non-performing loan ratio in excess of 15% 
(compared with 3% before the crisis) and posted a consolidated net loss of UAH 13.0 
billion (albeit down from UAH 38.3 billion in 2009).  
More encouragingly, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) managed to control inflation 
relatively well by historical standards in 2010. Following three years of double-digit 
increases in consumer prices, the year-average headline inflation in 2010 came to 9.4%. 
Core inflation was even slightly lower, at 8.6%, reflecting the fact that part of the price 
pressure stemmed from increases in excise taxes and administered prices, notably for gas 
and communal heating services, in line with the IMF programme.  
In its fiscal policy, Ukraine also broadly followed the consolidation course agreed with 
the IMF under the July 2010 SBA. At just over 5% of GDP, the general government 
deficit was even lower than the programme target of 5.5% in 2010, although this positive 
development was offset by the higher-than-mandated deficit of Naftogaz, which occurred 
despite the gas price hikes implemented under the programme. General government debt 
stood at approximately 36% of GDP, a notable deceleration of the steep increases seen 
during the crisis years of 2008 and 2009. 
On the external front, the positive adjustment of the current account that had resulted 
from the crisis-related contraction of imports during 2009 continued through the first half 
of 2010, before starting to reverse as domestic demand picked up. The current account 
slipped back into deficit in Q3 2010, i.e. even before the start of the heating season, 
which traditionally entails higher gas imports for Ukraine.  
Positively, the country was able to tap various sources of external financing. Notably, 
this included a return to capital markets with a combined USD 2.5 billion of Eurobonds 
issued in September and December 2010 and a further USD  1.5  billion issued in 
February 2011. The government also secured a USD  2  billion revolving loan from a 
Russian state-owned bank and, most importantly, a new Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) 
with the IMF in July 2010, worth USD 15 billion and running to end-2012 (following the 
stalling of the preceding SBA in November 2009 over Ukraine’s lack of compliance with 
agreed programme parameters). Meanwhile, negotiations between Ukraine and the EU 
on a macro-financial assistance loan of EUR 610 million were launched, but not 
concluded, in 2010 (see below). 
The combination of multilateral, bilateral and private external borrowing by the 
government, along with a gradual return of external lending to private borrowers in 
Ukraine, allowed the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) to replenish its foreign exchange 
reserves from a low of USD 24.1 billion in February 2010 to USD 34.6 billion at year-
end.  
Thus, 2010 was overall a successful year for Ukraine in terms of external economic 
stabilisation. However, the relatively weak rebound in investment, along with persistent 
problems in the operating environment for businesses in Ukraine, calls into question the 
medium-term sustainability of the recovery. With the current account deficit widening 
again and debt roll-over requirements of around USD  43  billion, the country may 
continue to depend on official external financial support in 2011 if it is to avoid a  
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recurrence of a drain on its foreign currency reserves, as happened during the crisis in 
2008-09.  
This underlines the importance of continued cooperation with the IMF. Ukraine 
successfully concluded the first review of the IMF programme, triggering the release of 
its second tranche (of approximately USD 1.5 billion) in December 2010. However, the 
completion of the second review of the programme, initially scheduled for March 2011, 
has been delayed reflecting notably the postponement of parliamentary adoption of 
pension reform legislation. 
7.3.  Structural reforms 
The IMF programme was instrumental as an external anchor for structural reform 
progress in Ukraine in 2010. In particular, domestic gas prices were increased and are to 
be raised further in a gradual manner with a view to bringing retail energy prices to cost 
recovery levels, thereby reducing the need for state transfers to Naftogaz. As part of the 
IMF programme, Ukraine also started working on pension entitlement reform and 
committed to a reorientation of monetary policy towards domestic price stability as the 
primary objective, even if the resulting gradual relaxation of the de facto exchange rate 
peg to the US dollar did not become apparent over the course of 2010. Changes in the 
NBU law also strengthened the central bank’s independence (a reform also contained in 
the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda). 
In a separate development monitored closely both by the IMF and the EU, the Ukrainian 
government reduced the arrears on VAT refunds that had existed for many years and 
swollen to unprecedented levels during the crisis. In August 2010, the government issued 
VAT bonds with a face value of UAH 16.4 billion or 1.6% of GDP to companies with 
outstanding VAT refund claims. While this measure cleared a large part of the state’s 
VAT refund debt, it was controversial in the business community, both domestically and 
abroad, as companies felt compelled to sign up (perceiving the bond scheme as the only 
way of being paid at all), even though the bonds offered a coupon inferior to market 
yields of comparable government bonds. Indeed, companies in need of cash for their 
operations had to sell the bonds at a discount of reportedly 20-30% of face value. There 
were also complaints about preferential treatment of companies with close ties to the 
authorities, while other enterprises reported that part of their VAT refund claims were 
not recognised and remained unpaid. Moreover, contrary to government claims that it has 
addressed the VAT refund problems in a durable manner, a renewed build-up of arrears 
was reported by companies in late 2010. 
The controversy about the VAT bond scheme was part of a general picture of growing 
concern on the part of businesses about the operating and investment environment in 
Ukraine in the final part of 2010, in particular regarding red tape and a lack of 
transparency in dealings with the administration. In November-December 2010, 
divergences between the government and the business community came to a head when 
entrepreneurs protested publicly for several weeks against a planned overhaul of the Tax 
Code. However, the government ultimately managed to defuse the protests by offering 
some targeted concessions to SMEs and entrepreneurs, thus securing passage of one of 
its flagship reform projects before year-end. 
Aside from the Tax Code, key pieces of legislation in the government’s economic reform 
agenda of 2010 have been new laws on public procurement and the functioning of the  
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gas market (providing notably for the unbundling of Naftogaz and the end of its domestic 
monopoly), as well as the Budget Code, on the basis of which the authorities drew up a 
2011 budget in line with the consolidation benchmarks agreed with the IMF. However, in 
many areas, there are problems or delays with the implementation and enforcement of 
new laws, which can therefore not unfold their desired positive impact on the business 
climate. For example, this has been the case for the public procurement law, as well as 
the Tax Code, while many businesses also still complain about arbitrary customs 
valuation procedures, despite the fact that WTO-compliant legislation is in place. 
The policy programme that is associated with the EU’s planned MFA operation and 
currently under negotiation between the European Commission and Ukraine therefore 
seeks to support further legislative developments, as well as the implementation side of 
the economic reform agenda in Ukraine. Meanwhile, recent and ongoing reforms in the 
area of public finance management will be assessed in a Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability (PEFA) study that is being conducted jointly by the World 
Bank and the European Commission. The results of this PEFA study that will be 
updating the one conducted by the World Bank in 2007will be available in the second 
half of 2011. 
7.4.   Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Following the Commission proposal for MFA of EUR 500 million to Ukraine, adopted in 
late 2009 in response to a Ukrainian request of the same year, the co-legislators approved 
the package in July 2010 (as the first MFA Decision adopted under the ordinary 
legislative procedure as per the Lisbon Treaty). In addition, EUR 110 million of MFA 
stemming from a Council Decision of 2002 are still available to Ukraine. In parallel to 
the co-legislator’s deliberations and in order to prepare the eventual implementation of 
the MFA, the Commission launched a new Operational Assessment of administrative 
procedures and financial circuits of public organisations involved in the management of 
MFA in Ukraine. The consultants submitted their final report in April 2010. Its general 
conclusion is that the framework for sound financial management is effective in Ukraine, 
despite several weaknesses detected during this mission, such as the absence of an 
efficient external audit function, deficiencies in the transparency of public procurement 
and difficulties in the financial management of state-owned enterprises.  
As of end-2010, the assistance was still at the negotiation stage; no disbursement was 
made in the course of the year. The Commission organised a mission to Kiev in July 
2010, immediately after the adoption of the aforementioned MFA Decision, to gather 
detailed information on the economic situation of the country following the crisis of 
2008-09 and on the government’s planned reforms. The IMF also sent a mission to 
Ukraine in July 2010, following which the Executive Board, on 28 July, approved a new 
Stand-By Arrangement worth up to SDR 10 billion and running to end-2012. 
On this basis, the Commission proposed to combine the EU’s MFA loan amounts of the 
2002 and 2010 Decisions in a single package (covered by one Memorandum of 
Understanding and one Loan Agreement) of up to EUR 610 million. This is to be split 
into four tranches (of EUR 100 million, EUR 10 million, EUR 250 million and EUR 250 
million), of which the second and third (a combined EUR 260 million) could be 
disbursed on the same date. First drafts of the Memorandum of Understanding and Loan 
Agreement were presented to the authorities at the end of the staff mission in July. The 
policy measures proposed therein take into account the shortcomings in public finance  
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management detected by the Operational Assessment (conducted in 2009), while also 
covering important structural reform priority areas, notably taxation and trade (including 
the VAT refund system and customs valuation practices), energy (unbundling and 
increased transparency in the gas sector), and finance (legislative approximation with the 
EU).  
Bilateral consultations on the package took place over the following months; these talks 
were upgraded to negotiations by the Ukrainian side in November 2010, following the 
President’s official authorisation of a negotiating mandate for the Ministry of Finance. 
However, progress in these negotiations has been slow, reflecting reluctance on the part 
of the authorities to make clear commitments in some key reform areas, including 
external audit, VAT refund arrears and energy sector reform.  
Meanwhile, Ukraine successfully concluded the first review of the IMF programme, 
triggering the release of its second tranche (of approximately USD 1.5 billion) in 
December 2010. However, the completion of the second review of the programme, 
initially scheduled for March 2011, has been delayed reflecting notably the 
postponement of parliamentary adoption of pension reform legislation. Continued 
successful conclusions of IMF reviews under the current SBA, as well as an agreement 
between Ukraine and the EU on the pending Memorandum of Understanding and Loan 
Agreement, are pre-conditions for any disbursements of EU MFA in 2011. 
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UKRAINE - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1. Price liberalisation   
Most prices are free, but regulated prices prevail for some utilities, notably gas, as well as in 
some other areas.  
2. Trade liberalisation   
Ukraine joined the WTO in May 2008. However, export duties and quotas on individual products 
remain in force, and complaints by importers about technical and administrative barriers to trade 
abound. Positively, in late 2010 legal changes were adopted that will facilitate the gradual 
replacement of obligatory pre-market certification of non-food products (which presently 
constitutes a trade barrier) with a system of market surveillance. 
3. Exchange rate regime   
While not officially operating a peg or band, the National Bank of Ukraine effectively manages 
the level of the hryvnia against the US dollar. Since the crisis-related devaluation in late 2008, 
the central bank has held the hryvnia at close to UAH 8:USD. A gradual reorientation of 
monetary policy towards domestic price stability has been agreed between Ukraine and the IMF.  
4. Foreign direct investment   
FDI-related flows are largely liberalised, and since May 2010 a registration of foreign investment 
is no longer compulsory. Meanwhile, some sectors remain closed to foreign ownership, notably 
the gas transmission system.  
5. Monetary policy   
The National Bank of Ukraine is responsible for controlling the domestic money supply. 
Amendments to the NBU law of 2010 aimed at strengthening the bank’s political independence 
and its responsibility for price stability. However, in practice, exchange rate stability (against the 
US dollar) still takes precedence over of domestic inflation control.  
6. Public finances   
General government expenditure made up an estimated 48.3% of GDP in 2010. Nearly three-
quarters of Ukraine’s government expenditure goes towards wages and social transfers (including 
over one-third on pensions). Gradual domestic gas price increases under the IMF programme are 
aimed at balancing Naftogaz’ finances, thus relieving budgetary pressures. Ukraine has also 
undertaken some reforms in its public finance management systems (e.g. in public procurement), 
but many challenges remain (e.g. in tax and customs administration and the fight against 
corruption). 
7. Privatisation and enterprise restructuring   
State-owned companies continue to dominate certain sectors, in particular utilities; the gas sector 
holding Naftogaz remains largely unreformed; and the privatisation of strategic assets, including 
the gas transmission system, is prohibited by law. In December 2010 a ban on privatisation of 
several big companies in the power generation and mining sectors was lifted, and the 
privatisation of telecommunications company Ukrtelecom was launched. 
8. Financial sector reform   
At the end of 2010, 176 banks were operating in Ukraine, including 17 foreign-owned institutes. 
Before the crisis, Ukraine had two state-owned banks. In 2009 this number increased to five as 
the state became majority-owner in three troubled banks. An audit by the NBU in late 2010 
revealed that these banks require further substantial injections of state resources. Aside from the 
consolidation and recapitalisation of the banking system, it is the authorities’ declared objective 
to develop domestic private capital markets and to upgrade the independence and capacity of 
financial regulators.   
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MEDITERRANEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD COUNTRIES 
8.  LEBANON 
8.1.  Executive summary 
Mediterranean Neighbourhood Countries are eligible for MFA under the Genval Criteria. 
Lebanon is the first country of this group benefiting from MFA since the balance of 
payments loan granted in 1994 to Algeria (Decision 1994/933/EC). 
Lebanon’s economy continued to grow at a remarkable – although slightly lower – rate 
during 2010, aided by the prudent macroeconomic policies of the past years and a well 
functioning banking system. The formation of a new national unity government in late 
2009 helped to restore confidence and enabled a marked acceleration in capital inflows, 
including a steady stream of foreign deposits in the banking sector during 2010. The 
fiscal position, as well as the balance of payments position, deteriorated moderately 
mainly due to rises in government expenditures and oil prices. The sizeable debt-to-GDP 
ratio improved, prolonging the declining trend of the previous years. On the back of the 
unfolding political and social crisis, the Banque du Liban (BdL) has become an effective 
regulator and the central pillar of economic management in the country  
While macroeconomic management and performance was broadly satisfactory in 2010, 
the country continued to fail to make progress with structural reforms reflecting the lack 
of consensus within the coalition government. Political instability remains in 2011 a 
main destabilisation factor of the Lebanese economy, with the Prime Minister designate, 
Najib Mikati, struggling to form a cabinet.  
In December 2007, the Council adopted a decision on a MFA to Lebanon amounting to 
EUR 80 million – a combination of medium-term loans (EUR 50 million) and grants 
(EUR 30 million), to be disbursed in two tranches. The first tranches of grants and loans 
were disbursed in December 2008 and June 2009 respectively. At the end of 2009, the 
Commission proposed a one-year extension of the period of availability of the assistance  
to 21 December 2010, to be formalised through an addendum to the Memorandum of 
Understanding. However, this addendum was never signed by the authorities. This, as 
well as the lack of progress with implementing the MFA conditions and the lack of a 
successor IMF arrangement thwarted the disbursement of the second tranche of the 
MFA, which has now expired. 
8.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
The Lebanese economy showed great resilience to the global financial crisis despite the 
politically uncertain environment. Buoyant economic activity led to an estimated real 
GDP growth of almost 8% in 2010 from almost 9% in the previous year. This remarkable 
performance was partly attributed to low degree of exposure to international financial 
markets and the implementation of prudent banking regulations and supervision. 
Inflation pressures stemming mainly from fuel and food price increases intensified 
during 2010; average inflation reached 5% during the year after the sharp drop to 1.2% in 
2009 in the context of the global crisis and the associated decline in international 
commodity prices.   
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The government budget deficit (including grants) is estimated to have widened to 8.7% 
of GDP in 2010 from 8.1% in 2009, partly reflecting capital expenditures increases, 
including substantial investments in electricity generation, and other government 
expenses, that more than outweighed buoyant fiscal revenues. Despite its steady 
declining trend during the last years, public debt remains at extremely high levels (139% 
of GDP in 2010) and almost half of it is denominated in foreign currency, underlying the 
country’s external vulnerability and fiscal consolidation challenges.  A combination of 
expenditure rationalization and socially balanced tax measures is necessary for lowering 
the debt burden, while maintaining permanently higher investment and social spending. 
On the back of increases in oil prices and the rebound of real import growth, the current 
account balance (including official grants) deteriorated to -11.1% of GDP from -9.5% in 
2009. On a more positive note, the external debt-to-GDP ratio declined to 160% by the 
end in 2010 (from 171% in end 2009), continuing the moderate downward trend 
witnessed in previous years.  
In order to reduce the vulnerability to external shocks, the Banque du Liban has 
endeavoured to retain a comfortable level of international reserves. Abundant capital 
inflows enabled the accumulation of foreign currency reserves during the last years, 
reaching the record level of EUR 32.2 billion in 2010 (corresponding to 10.3 months of 
next year’s imports of goods and services), as compared to EUR 26.8 billion in 2009.  
Despite the overall resilience of the Lebanese economy to global headwinds in 2010, the 
economic situation remains vulnerable. Substantial imbalances in the public finances and 
external accounts could affect the credibility of the exchange rate peg in the longer term. 
The economy is currently directly affected by the political and social unrest in the Arab 
world, given that some of its main trading and financial partners are the countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa. In particular, Lebanon depends significantly on worker 
remittances and investments from Gulf Cooperation Council countries. It is also highly 
dependent on imported hydrocarbons for almost all its energy needs, making the country 
particularly vulnerable to international oil price increases. Apart from political risks and 
the slow global upswing, economic vulnerability stems from the high public and external 
debt, the reliance on just a few sectors to provide the bulk of growth, uncertainty about 
the persistence of foreign inflows in a situation where banks continue to have maturity 
mismatches, and possible inflation risks also in view of rising commodity prices.  
8.3.  Structural reforms 
Implementation of the ambitious programme of structural reforms adopted in the 
aftermath of the Paris agreements stalled as a consequence of the political stalemate, 
which paralysed progress in legislative activity in the run-up to the June 2009 
parliamentary elections and during the protracted subsequent negotiations on forming a 
new government.  
During 2010, while macroeconomic policies were relatively prudent, progress in growth-
enhancing structural reforms was rather poor. The implementation of key structural 
reform measures set by the Paris III donor conference and the two IMF’s Emergency 
Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) programmes, including raising the value added tax 
(VAT) rate, eliminating extra-budgetary funds, and strengthening public finance 
management (including overhauling the budget process), was clearly below expectations. 
Changing the heavily subsidised electricity system is another urgent priority in phase of  
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the frequent power shortages. In addition, modernizing tax administration and reforming 
the water and telecommunications sectors remain key elements of Lebanon’s reform 
agenda.  
Fiscal reforms, including expanding revenue collection, are necessary to reduce the large 
public debt stock. However, the adoption of fiscal reforms was thwarted by the lack of 
political consensus within the coalition government. The draft 2010 budget entailed an 
increase in capital spending of 2.4% of GDP, including substantial investments in 
electricity generation, but an increase in VAT rate was not feasible due to lack of 
political support. Privatization of the two state-owned mobile-phone operators and 
restructuring of the heavily subsidised state-owned electricity provider, Electricité du 
Liban (EDL), have been put on ice, reflecting ongoing uncertainty about market 
conditions, and are not expected before 2012. Nevertheless, a 20% cut in subsidies to 
EDL was achieved in 2010, due to the substitution of the provider’s imported fuel oil by 
Egyptian gas. A 25% stake in the national air carrier MEA, held by the central bank, was 
announced to be floated in 2010 thus delaying the time path for full privatisation. 
In the field of public finance management, progress with improving budgetary planning 
and control has been limited. This concerns measures aimed at improving budget 
formulation and execution, cash management and implementation of a Single Treasury 
Account. The 2010 budget approved in April 2010 includes some provisions on fiscal 
accountability, but this does not imply a multi-annual fiscal framework. 
In summer 2010, the Commission undertook, with the help of a team of consultants, an 
assessment of the PFM systems in Lebanon according to the methodology developed in 
the context of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) partnership. 
The PEFA assessment is still being discussed with the authorities and has not been 
finalised yet.  
It should be noted that several of the above reforms, namely the introduction of a Single 
Treasury Account, the reform of electricity tariffs and the privatisation of mobile phone 
networks were among the key policy conditions of the MFA operation decided in 2007.   
In view of the large weight of the financial sector in the Lebanese economy, actions to 
improve prudential oversight and regulations are a key component of the structural 
reform agenda. Against this background, the Banque du Liban and IMF agreed to have 
an updated examination under the Financial Stability Assessment Programme in 2010 
This would be valuable to identify vulnerabilities in the Lebanese financial system and to 
benchmark against new standards of oversight that are being implemented 
internationally. The high interest rate spreads charged by commercial banks on domestic 
loans discourage both lending (notably to small and medium-term enterprises) and the 
growth of local currency deposits in a highly dollarized economy. 
More generally, many impediments to a conducive business climate remain unresolved. 
Hence, the ranking of Lebanon according to several business climate measures remained 
poor in comparison with regional peers, many of which made progress in recent years. It 
is crucial that the authorities proceed with reviving the stalled reform agenda to make 
growth in the country less dependant on a few industries only, such as finance, and to 
develop growth potential in other sectors. Despite relatively favourable macroeconomic 
developments in the last year, the fiscal deficit and public debt remain high and progress 
with fiscal consolidation to reduce the hefty burden of public debt service remains a key 
priority to ensure sustainability.  
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8.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In 2008, the Commission started the implementation of the Council Decision 
2007/860/EC providing macro-financial assistance of EUR 80 million in the form of a 
combination of a medium-term loan and grant of EUR 50 and 30 million respectively. 
The assistance complemented support from the Bretton Woods institutions, bilateral 
donors (including EU Member States and Arab countries), and other EU assistance 
provided under the ENPI and in the form of EIB loans. 
The EU MFA aimed primarily at supporting the authorities' effort of fiscal consolidation, 
strengthening public finance management and encouraging privatisation efforts. Thus, 
the specific reform measures targeted by the programme focused on public finance 
management and on two specific sector policies of particular importance for fiscal 
adjustment and debt reduction, namely the power sector and the social sector. Agreement 
on the conditions to be attached to the disbursement of the assistance was reached in the 
course of 2008. Subsequently, the EUR 15 million first tranche of the grant was 
disbursed end-December 2008. The first tranche of a 5-year loan of EUR 25 million was 
disbursed on 4 June 2009.  
The disbursement of the second tranche was subject to the fulfilment of the agreed policy 
conditionality. One important element of conditionality is the existence of an ongoing 
IMF programme. On 9 April 2007 the IMF Board had approved an Emergency Post-
Conflict Arrangement (EPCA I) of SDR 50.75 million based on the five-year reform 
program presented by the Lebanese authorities at the Paris III conference in January 
2007 In November 2008, the IMF Board approved a second EPCA package of SDR 
25.375 million. The EPCA II programme expired at the end of June 2009, with the 
quantitative targets (focusing on an increase in foreign currency reserves and on targeting 
a reduction in the primary fiscal balance) comfortably met. However, key non-
quantitative targets were not met, notably the introduction of a single Treasury account; 
the reform of electricity tariffs; and the privatisation of mobile phone networks. No 
further IMF programmes have been launched. 
Following the expiration of the IMF arrangement, progress with fulfilling the conditions 
was very limited in 2009 due to the difficult political situation in the run-up to elections. 
Against this background, in December 2009, the Commission proposed to extend the 
availability period of the second tranche of the assistance programme by one year (from 
21 December 2009 to 21 December 2010) through an addendum to the MoU. This 
addendum was, however, never signed by the Lebanese authorities.  
On 13 December 2010 the Lebanese Minister of Finance requested an extension on the 
disbursement period of the second tranche by the Commission and a review of the 
conditionality attached to the MFA program. The request was rejected by the 
Commission on the grounds of poor implementation by the national authorities of the key 
structural reform conditions during the period of validity of the MFA operation, the lack 
of a successor IMF financial arrangement, the failure of the authorities to accept the 
proposed extension of the period of validity of the MoU and the improvement of 
Lebanon’s balance of payments position. Hence, this MFA expired without the 
disbursement of the second tranche. 
  
49 
LEBANON - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM  
1. Price liberalisation 
Most prices are free, but the government subsidises the price of wheat. 
2. Trade liberalisation 
Liberal international trade policy, but protectionist measures are occasionally introduced. 
Lebanon is a founding member of GATT but it withdrew in 1949. It is now negotiating the 
accession to WTO.  
3. Exchange regime 
Fixed exchange rate (peg to the USD). No restrictions on current international transactions 
in conformity with Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Lebanon has also 
achieved substantial capital account convertibility. 
4. Foreign direct investment 
Unlimited repatriation of capital and profits and no limitations on holding foreign currency 
bank accounts. Legislation is overall adequate and an investment development authority 
exists but enforcement of contracts is sometimes problematic in the absence of commercial 
courts and independent judiciary.  
5. Monetary policy 
The Banque du Liban uses a wide range of monetary policy instruments to maintain 
financial stability and provide liquidity to the banking sector. It also occasionally provides 
financing to the government (on a temporary basis). The exchange rate peg is regarded as a 
key factor in maintaining monetary stability 
6. Public finance 
The high public debt ratio and high interest rates at which the government is borrowing 
remain issues of concern. The tax base remains shallow and skewed towards indirect taxes. 
Significant tax exemptions are granted to the banking sector, notably as regards the taxing 
foreign deposits. Public finance management reform focuses on budget formulation and 
execution and medium-term planning. There has been little progress on this front in recent 
years. Key issues, such as the Treasury Single Account law, are still pending before 
Parliament. 
7. Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
The structural reform programme focuses on privatisation, improvement of business climate, 
privatisations, and opening of markets, but progress has been stalled due to the political 
situation. Important privatisations, for instance of mobile telephony licenses and the 
electricity company, have been postponed. 
8. Financial sector reform 
Lebanon has a sophisticated and developed financial sector, based on domestic private 
banks, which proved resilient to shocks despite vulnerabilities. However, it exhibits a high 
degree of dollarization, with 79.6% of loans and 62.9% of deposits as of March 2010 being 
denominated in foreign currency. 
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Annex 1A -  COMMUNITY  MACRO-FINANCIAL  AND  EXCEPTIONAL 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES BY DATES OF COUNCIL 
DECISIONS 
 
Status of effective disbursements as of end-December 2010 (in millions of €) 
 
Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements disbursed
Hungary I 22.02.90 90/83/EC 870 Apr. 1990 350 610 260
(Loan) Feb. 1991 260 (Suspended)
Czech and  25.02.91 91/106/EC 375 Mar. 1991 185 375
Slovak Federal Republic Mar. 1992 190
Hungary II 24.06.91 91/310/EC 180 Aug. 1991 100 180
(Loan) Jan. 1993 80
Bulgaria I  24.06.91 91/311/EC 290 Aug. 1991 150 290
(Loan) Mar. 1992 140
Romania I 22.07.91 91/384/EC 375 Jan. 1992 190 375
(Loan) Apr. 1992 185
Israel
1 22.07.91 91/408/EC 187,5 Mar. 1992 187,5 187,5
(Loan)
Algeria I 23.09.91 91/510/EC 400 Jan. 1992 250 400
(Loan) Aug. 1994 150
Albania I 28.09.92 92/482/EC 70 Dec. 1992 35 70
(Grant) Aug. 1993 35
Bulgaria II 19.10.92 92/511/EC 110 Dec. 1994 70 110
(Loan) Aug .1996 40
Baltics 23.11.92 92/542/EC 220 135 85
(Loans); of which: (Suspended)
    Estonia (40) March 1993 20 (20) (20)
    Latvia (80) March 1993 40 (40) (40)
    Lithuania (100) July 1993 50 (75) (25)
Aug. 1995 25
Romania II 27.11.92 92/551/EC 80 Feb. 1993 80 80
(Loan)
Moldova I 13.06.94 94/346/EC 45 Dec. 1994 25 45
(Loan) Aug. 1995 20
Romania III 20.06.94 94/369/EC 125 Nov. 1995 55 125
(Loan) Sep. 1997 40
Dec. 1997 30
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements disbursed
 
Albania II 28.11.94 94/773/EC 35 June 1995 15 35
(Grant) Oct. 1996 20
Algeria II 22.12.94 94/938/EC 200 Nov. 1995 100 100 100
(Loan) (Suspended)
Slovakia 22.12.94 94/939/EC 130 July 1996 130
(Loan) (Cancelled)
Ukraine I 22.12.94 94/940/EC 85 Dec. 1995 85 85
(Loan)
Belarus 10.04.95 95/132/EC 55 Dec. 1995 30 30 25
(Loan) (Suspended)
Ukraine II 23.10.95 95/442/EC 200 Aug. 1996 50 200
(Loan) Oct. 1996 50
Sep. 1997 100
Moldova II 25.03.96 96/242/EC 15 Dec. 1996 15 15
(Loan)
Former Yugoslav  22.07.97 97/471/EC 40 Sep. 1997 25 40
Republic of Macedonia I Feb. 1998 15
(Loan)
Bulgaria III 22.07.97 97/472/EC 250 Feb. 1998 125 250
( Loan) Dec. 1998 125
Armenia, Georgia  17.11.97 97/787/EC 375 294,5 80,5
and Tajikistan
2 modified by
(Loans and grants) 28.3.00 00/244/EC
 Agreed amounts with the recipent countires: (328)
   Armenia (58) Dec. 1998 (loan) 28 (58)
   (Loan and grant) Dec. 1998 (grant) 8
Dec.  1999 (grant) 4
Feb. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Dec. 2002 (grant) 5,5
June 2004 (grant) 5,5
Dec. 2005 (grant) 1,5
   Georgia (175) Jul. 1998 (loan) 110 (141,5) (33,5)
   (Loan and grant) Aug. 1998 (grant) 10
Sep. 1999 (grant) 9
Dec. 2001 (grant) 6
Dec. 2004 (grant) 6,5
   Tajikistan (95) Mar. 2001 (loan) 60 (95)
   (Loan and grant) Mar. 2001 (grant) 7
Dec. 2001 (grant) 7
Feb. 2003 (grant) 7
May. 2005 (grant) 7
Oct. 2007 (grant) 7
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements disbursed
 
Ukraine III 15.10.98 98/592/EC 150 July 1999 58 58 92
(Loan) 12.07.02 02/639/EC (Cancelled)
Albania III 22.04.99 99/282/EC 20 20
( Loan)
Bosnia I
3 10.05.99 99/325/EC 60 Dec. 1999 (grant) 15 60
(Loan and grant) modified by Dec. 1999 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/899/EC Dec. 2000 (grant) 10
Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
Dec. 2001 (grant) 15
Bulgaria IV 08.11.99 99/731/EC 100 Dec. 1999 40 100
(Loan) Sep. 2000 60
Former Yugoslav  08.11.99 99/733/EC 80 Dec. 2000 (grant) 20 98
Republic of 18 Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
Macedonia II
4 10.12.01 01/900/EC Dec. 2001 (loan) 12
(Loan and grant) Dec. 2001 (grant) 10
May 2003 (grant) 10
June 2003 (loan) 10
Dec. 2003 (loan) 18
Dec. 2003 (grant) 8
Romania  IV 08.11.99 99/732/EC 200 June 2000 100 150 50
(Loan) July 2003 50
Kosovo I
5 19.02.00 00/140/EC 35 Mar. 2000 20 35
(Grant ) Aug. 2000 15
Montenegro
5 22.05.00 00/355/EC 20 Aug. 2000 7 20
(Grant ) Dec. 2000 13
Moldova III 10.07.00 00/452/EC 15 15
(Loan) 19.12.02 02/1006/EC (Cancelled)
Kosovo II
3 27.06.01 01/511/EC 30 Sep. 2001 15 30
(Grant) Dec.  2002 15
Serbia and  16.07.01 01/549/EC 345 Oct. 2001 (loan) 225 345
Montenegro I
6 Oct. 2001 (grant) 35
(ex FRY) 10.12.01 01/901/EC Jan. 2002 (grant) 40
(Loan and grant) Aug. 2002 (grant) 45
Ukraine IV 12.07.02 02/639/EC 110 110
(Loan) Modification of Decision 
98/592/EC
Serbia and  05.11.02 02/882/EC 130 Dec. 2002 (grant) 30 105 25
Montenegro II
7 Feb. 2003 (loan) 10
(ex FRY) Aug. 2003 (grant) 35
(Loan and grant) Aug. 2003 (loan) 30
modified by
modified by
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements disbursed
 
Bosnia II
8 05.11.02 02/883/EC 60 Feb. 2003 (grant) 15 25  the rest was 
(Loan and grant) Dec. 2003 (grant) 10 paid under
04/861/EC
Moldova IV 19.12.02 02/1006/EC 15 15
(Grant)
Serbia and  25.11.03 03/825/EC 70 Dec. 2004 (grant) 10 10 20
Montenegro II
7  the rest was 
(ex FRY) paid under
Modification Decision 02/882/EC (grant) 04/862/EC
Albania IV
9 29.04.04 04/580/EC 25 Nov. 2005 (grant) 3 25
(Loan and grant) March 2006 ( loan) 9
July 2006 (grant) 13
Bosnia II
8 7/12/2004 04/861/EC the balance of Dec. 2004 (loan) 10 35
Modification Decision  02/883/EC June 2005 (grant) 15
02/883/EC (grant and loan) Feb. 2006 (loan) 10
Serbia and  07.12.2004 04/862/EC the balance of April 2005 (loan) 15 40
Montenegro II
7 03/825/EC Dec. 2005 (grant) 25
(ex FRY)
Modification Decision 02/882/EC (Grant and loan)
Georgia II         24.01.06 06/41/EC 33,5 August 2006 (grant) 11 22 11,5
(Grant) Dec. 2006 (grant) 11
Kosovo (Grant) 30.11.06 06/880/EC 50 Sept. 2010 (grant) 30 30 20
(expired)
Moldova 16.04.07 07/259/EC 45 Oct. 2007 (grant) 20 45
(Grant) June 2008 (grant) 10
Dec. 2008 ( grant) 15
Lebanon
10 10.12.07 07/860/EC 80 Dec. 2008 (grant)  15 40 40
(Loan and grant) June 2009 (loan) 25
Georgia 30.11.09 09/889/EC 46 Dec. 2009 (grant) 15,3 46
(Grant) Jan. 2010 (grant) 7,7
August 2010 (grant) 23
Armenia
11 30.11.09 09/890/EC 100 100
(Loan and grant)
Bosnia and  30.11.09 09/891/EC 100 100
Herzegovina (Loan)
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements disbursed
Serbia (Loan) 30.11.09 09/892/EC 200 200
Ukraine (Loan) 29.06.10 338/2010/EU 500 500
Moldova (Grant) 20.10.10 938/2010/EU 90 Dec. 2010 (grant) 40 40 50
TOTAL 7440 5391 2049
                                                            
   were actually agreed with the beneficiary countries
4 Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 50 million and grants of up to € 48 million
5 Exceptional financial assistance
6 Includes a loan principal amount of € 225 million and grants of € 120 million
7 Includes a loan principal amount of € 55 million and grants of € 75 million
8 Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million
9 Includes a loan principal amount of € 9 million and grants of € 16 million
10 Includes a loan principal amount of € 50 million and grants of € 30 million
11 Includes a loan principal amount of € 65 million and grants of € 35 million
  Out of the global amount of € 375 million, maximum amounts of € 58 million, € 175 million and € 95 million 
3 Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 20 million and grants of up to € 40 million
1 Assistance to Israel includes a loan principal amount of € 160 million and grants of € 27.5 million in the form of interest subsidies
2 Exceptional financial assistance, which includes a ceiling of € 245 million for the loans and a ceiling of € 130 million for the grants
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Annex 1B - COMMUNITY MACRO-FINANCIAL AND EXCEPTIONAL 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES BY REGION 
 
Status of effective disbursements as of end-December 2010 (in millions of €) 
 
Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements
A. EU Accession countries
Baltics 23.11.92 92/542/EC 220 135 85
(Loans) of which : (Suspended)
    Estonia (40) March 1993 20 (20) (20)
    Latvia (80) March 1993 40 (40) (40)
    Lithuania (100) July 1993 50 (75) (25)
Aug. 1995 25
Bulgaria I  24.06.91 91/311/EC 290 Aug. 1991 150 290
(Loan) March 1992 140
Bulgaria II 19.10.92 92/511/EC 110 Dec. 1994 70 110
(Loan) Aug. 1996 40
Bulgaria III 22.07.97 97/472/EC 250 Feb. 1998 125 250
(Loan) Dec. 1998 125
Bulgaria IV 08.11.99 99/731/EC 100 Dec. 1999 40 100
(Loan) Sep. 2000 60
Czech and  25.02.91 91/106/EC 375 March 1991 185 375
Slovak Federal Republic March 1992 190
(Loan)
Hungary I 22.02.90 90/83/EC 870 Apr. 1990 350 610 260
(Structural adjustment loan) Feb. 1991 260 ( Suspended)
Hungary II 24.06.91 91/310/EC 180 Aug. 1991 100 180
(loan) Jan. 1993 80
Romania I 22.07.91 91/384/EC 375 Jan. 1992 190 375
(Loan) Apr. 1992 185
Romania II 27.11.92 92/551/EC 80 Feb. 1993 80 80
(Loan)
Romania III 20.06.94 94/369/EC 125 Nov. 1995 55 125
(Loan) Sep. 1997 40
Dec. 1997 30
Romania  IV 08.11.99 99/732/EC 200 June 2000 100 150 50
(Loan) July 2003 50
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements
 
Slovakia 22.12.94 94/939/EC 130 July 1996 130
(Loan) Cancelled
TOTAL A 3305 2780 525
B. Western Balkans
Albania I 28.09.92 92/482/EC 70 Dec. 1992 35 70
(Grant) Aug. 1993 35
Albania II 28.11.94 94/773/EC 35 June 1995 15 35
(Grant) Oct. 1996 20
Albania III 22.04.99 99/282/EC 20 20
(Loan) ( Cancelled)
Bosnia I
1 10.05.99 99/325/EC 60 Dec. 1999 (grant) 15 60
(Loan and grant) Dec. 1999 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/899/EC Dec. 2000 (grant) 10
Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
Dec. 2001 (grant) 15
Former Yugoslav Republic  22.07.97 97/471/EC 40 Sep. 1997 25 40
of Macedonia I (Loan) Feb. 1998 15
Former Yugoslav Republic 08.11.99 99/733/EC 80 Dec. 2000 (grant) 20 98
of Macedonia II
2 Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
(Loan and grant) 10.12.2001 01/900/EC 18 Dec. 2001 (loan) 12
Dec. 2001 (grant) 10
May 2003 (grant) 10
June 2003 (loan) 10
Dec. 2003 (loan) 18
Dec. 2003 (grant) 8
Kosovo I
3 19.02.00 00/140/EC 35 March 2000 20 35
(Grant) Aug. 2000 15
Kosovo II
3 27.06.01 01/511/EC 30 Sep. 2001 15 30
(Grant) Dec. 2002 15
Montenegro
3 22.05.00 00/355/EC 20 Aug. 2000 7 20
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2000 13
Serbia and Montenegro I
4 16.07.01 01/549/EC 345 Oct. 2001 (grant) 35 345
modified by Oct. 2001 (loan) 225
10.12.2001 01/901/EC Jan. 2002 (grant) 40
Aug.2002 (grant) 45
modified by
modified by
(ex FRY)
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements
Serbia and Montenegro II
5 05.11.02 02/882/EC 130 Dec. 2002 (grant) 30 105 25
Feb. 2003 (loan) 10
Aug. 2003 (grant) 35
Aug. 2003 (loan) 30
25.11.03 03/825/EC (7) 70 Dec. 2004 (grant) 10 50 20
07.12.04 04/862/EC April  2005 (loan) 15
Dec. 2005 (grant) 25
Bosnia II
6 05.11.02 02/883/EC 60 Feb. 2003 (grant) 15 60
Dec. 2003 (grant) 10
Dec 2004 (loan) 10
07.12.04 04/861/EC June 2005 (grant) 15
Feb. 2006 (loan) 10
Albania IV
8 29.04.04 04/580/EC 25 Nov  2005 (grant) 3 25
Mar 2006 (loan) 9
Jul 2006 (grant) 13
Kosovo  (Grant) 30.11.06 06/880/EC 50 Sept. 2010 30 30 20
(expired)
Bosnia-Herzegoviona
 (Loan) 30.11.09 09/891/EC 100 100
Serbia (Loan) 30.11.09 09/892/EC 200 200
TOTAL B 1388 1003 385
C. New Independent States (NIS)
Armenia, Georgia  17.11.97 97/787/EC 375 294,5 80,5
and Tajikistan
9 modified by downsized to
(Loans and grants)  28.3.00 00/244/EC
Agreed amounts with the recipent countires: (328)
   Armenia (58) Dec. 1998 (loan) 28 (58)
Dec. 1998 (grant) 8
Dec.  1999 (grant) 4
Feb. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Dec. 2002 (grant) 5,5
June 2004( grant) 5,5
Dec. 2005(grant) 1,5
   Georgia (175) July 1998 (loan) 110 (141,5) (33,5)
Aug. 1998 (grant) 10
Sep. 1999 (grant) 9
Dec. 2001 (grant) 6
Dec. 2004 (grant) 6,5
   Tajikistan (95) March 2001 (loan) 60 (95)
March 2001 (grant) 7
Dec. 2001 (grant) 7
Feb. 2003 (grant) 7
May 2005 (grant) 7
Oct 2006 (grant) 7
modified by
modified by
(Loan and grant)
(Loan and grant)
(ex FRY)
(Loan and grant)
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements
 
Belarus 10.04.95 95/132/EC 55 Dec. 1995 30 30 25
(Loan) (Suspended)
Moldova I 13.06.94 94/346/EC 45 Dec. 1994 25 45
(Loan) Aug. 1995 20
Moldova II 25.03.96 96/242/EC 15 Dec. 1996 15 15
(Loan)
Moldova III 10.07.00 00/452/EC 15 15
(Loan) 19.12.02 02/1006 EC (cancelled)
19.12.02 02/1006/EC 15 15
Ukraine I 22.12.94 94/940/EC 85 Dec. 1995 85 85
(Loan)
Ukraine II 23.10.95 95/442/EC 200 Aug. 1996 50 200
(Loan) Oct. 1996 50
Sep. 1997 100
Ukraine III 15.10.98 98/592/EC 150 July 1999 58 58 92
(Loan) (cancelled)
12.07.02 02/639/EC 110 110
Modification of decision 98/592/EC
Georgia II         21.01.06       06/41/EC 33,5 Aug. 2006 11 22 11,5
Dec 2006 11
Moldova        16.04.07      07/259/EC 45      Oct. 2007 20 45
June 2008 10
Dec. 2008 15
Georgia 30.11.09 09/889/EC 46 Dec. 2009 (grant) 15,3 46
Jan. 2009 (grant) 7,7
Aug. 2010 (grant) 23
Armenia
10 (Loan and grant) 30.11.09 09/890/EC 100 100
Ukraine (Loan) 29.06.10 388/10//EU 500 500
Moldova (Grant) 20.10.10 938/2010/EU 90 Dec. 2010 (grant) 40 40 50
TOTAL C 1879,5 880,5 999,0
Ukraine IV
Moldova IV
(Grant)
(Loan)
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Decision Decision amount disbursements disbursements
D. Mediterranean countries
Israel
11 22.07.91 91/408/EC 187,5 March 1992 187,5 187,5
(Structural adjustment soft loan)
Algeria I 23.09.91 91/510/EC 400 Jan. 1992 250 400
(Loan) Aug. 1994 150
Algeria II 22.12.94 94/938/EC 200 Nov. 1995 100 100 100
(Loan) (Suspended)
Lebanon
12 10.12.07      07/860/EC 80 Dec. 2008 15 40 40
June 2009 25
TOTAL D 867,5 727,5 140
TOTAL A+B+C+D 7440 5391 2049
1 Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million.
2 Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 50 million and grants of up to € 48 million.
3 Exceptional financial assistance.
4 Includes a loan principal amount of € 225 million and grants of € 120 million.
5 Includes a loan principal amount of € 55 million and grants of € 75 million
5 Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million
6 Includes a loan principal amount of € 25 million and grants of € 45 million
8 Includes a loan principal amount of € 9 million and grants of € 16 million
9 Exceptional financial assistance, which includes a ceiling of € 245 million for the loans and a ceiling of € 130 million for the grants
  Out of the global amount of € 375 million, maximum amounts of € 58 million, € 175 million and € 95 million were
  actually agreed with the beneficiary countries
10 Includes a loan principal amount of € 65 million and grants of € 35 million
11 Assistance to Israel includes a loan principal amount of ECU 160 million and grants of ECU 27,5 million in the form of interest subsidies.
12 Includes a loan principal amount of € 50 million and grants of € 30 million  